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ABSTRACT
Two important issues related to nuclear materials safeguards are the continuous
monitoring of nuclear processing facilities to verify that undeclared uranium is not
processed or enriched and to verify that declared uranium is accounted for. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with ensuring special nuclear
facilities are operating as declared and that proper material safeguards have been
followed. Traditional safeguards measures have relied on IAEA personnel inspecting
each facility and verifying material with authenticated instrumentation.
In newer facilities most plant instrumentation data are collected electronically and
stored in a central computer. Facilities collect this information for a variety of reasons,
most notably for process optimization and monitoring. The field of process monitoring
has grown significantly over the past decades, and techniques have been developed to
detect and identify changes and to improve reliability and safety. Several of these
techniques can also be applied to international and domestic safeguards.
This dissertation introduces a safeguards monitoring system developed for both
a simulated Uranium blend down facility, and a water-processing facility at the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory. For the simulated facility, a safeguards monitoring system is
developed using an Auto-Associative Kernel Regression model, and the effects of
incorporating facility specific radiation sensors and preprocessing the data are
examined. The best safeguards model was able to detect diversions as small as 1.1%.
For the ORNL facility, a load cell monitoring system was developed. This monitoring
system provides an inspector with an efficient way to identify undeclared activity and to
identify atypical facility operation, included diversions as small as 0.1 kg. The system
also provides a foundation for an on-line safeguards monitoring approach where
inspectors remotely facility data to draw safeguards conclusion, possibly reducing the
needed frequency and duration of a traditional inspection.
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INTRODUCTION
Two important issues related to nuclear materials safeguards are: 1) the

continuous monitoring of uranium enrichment facilities to verify that undeclared special
nuclear material is not processed and 2) that declared special nuclear material is
accounted for. For both cases, the material enrichment and flow need to be monitored.
This is of importance to both the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in enforcing the elements of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other agreements. The signatories of the NPT have
agreed not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices and have accepted safeguards on all nuclear material used in
peaceful nuclear activities [1, 2]. The basic measure by which the IAEA verifies the
fulfillment of these obligations is through nuclear material accountancy [3]. Therefore,
one goal of the IAEA is to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material
from peaceful activities in a timely manner [4, 5]. The significant quantity of nuclear
material and time period depends on the type of material. For example a significant
quantity of nuclear material is defined as 8 kg of plutonium, 8 kg of

233

U, 25 kg of 235U in

highly enriched uranium ( ≥20% 235U), 75 kg of 235U in low enriched uranium (<20%
235

U), or 20 tons of thorium. Time periods may range from one month (for pure

plutonium metal) to three months (for plutonium in irradiated fuel) [6]. A second goal of
the IAEA is to ensure that a plant declares all of the material it processes. Both are of
importance to the IAEA because diverted material and undeclared nuclear material
could be used in illegal manufacture of nuclear weapons. Nuclear safeguards are the
protective measures by which the IAEA ensures that nuclear material is accounted for.
Traditional safeguards include designating material balance areas (MBA)
throughout a facility. Several MBAs are common within bulk handling facilities. For
some nuclear facilities, because of the itemized nature of most nuclear material, simple
material control and accountability (MCA) is a sufficient safeguard. For example, a
nuclear power plant receives and ships nuclear fuel assemblies. The assemblies are
uniquely labeled and the nuclear components are not subdivided or easily removed.
For these assemblies, tracking each container and ensuring its integrity ensures that the
1

nuclear material is kept accountable. In this sense, the entire plant could be viewed as
a large MBA. Other facilities, namely fuel reprocessing plants and gas centrifuge
enrichment plants (GCEPs), separate, divide, mix, or redistribute special nuclear
material. In such facilities, MCA is no longer as simple as tracking a fuel bundle and
ensuring its integrity, so multiple MBAs are defined within the facility. For example,
reprocessing facilities have one MBA at the front end, a second MBA is typically defined
that encompasses the process area, and a third MBA is usually defined around the
product storage area at the tail end of the process. Material flow into and out of the
MBAs is monitored by collecting samples from various locations within the MBA for
destructive assay and measuring flows at predetermined locations at the boundaries of
the MBAs [7, 8]. The IAEA will inspect, either during scheduled or random short notice
inspections, equipment in each facility’s MBA and the calibration of the instrumentation
used to monitor the material flow between MBAs. Additionally, full inventories are
conducted periodically to verify the amount of material contained within a MBA, rather
than just confirming the material flow between MBAs.
All MBA measurements have a nominal measurement uncertainty. As facility
throughput increases, the absolute value of the measurement error uncertainty can
grow to larger than a significant quantity, thus providing no assurance that a significant
quantity of material has not been diverted within the required time period. Additionally,
the IAEA only verifies instrumentation calibration during an inspection. As nuclear
facilities continue to grow in number, size, and complexity, the manpower required to
monitor these facilities will continue to tax the limited resources of the IAEA. However,
modern facilities will incorporate digital instrumentation and data acquisition systems.
These data systems can be used to develop on-line, continuous or near-continuous
monitoring systems, allowing IAEA inspectors to, possibly in a remote manner,
efficiently verify equipment and instrument calibrations, as well as the total amount of
material processed. While historically used for maintenance scheduling and process
optimization, the general field of Process Monitoring encompasses the methods and
techniques of on-line continuous monitoring, much of which is directly applicable to
nuclear safeguards monitoring.
2

Process monitoring (PM) was developed to assist condition monitoring (CM) of
plant equipment. CM is the practice of identifying the operating status of system
components and using the current component condition to determine the optimal
maintenance schedule and to optimize operations. Previous maintenance strategies
relied on preventive or periodic maintenance and reactive maintenance. Preventive
maintenance means performing maintenance on a set time schedule, regardless of the
equipment’s current condition. Preventive maintenance has two disadvantages. First,
maintenance resources are wasted on systems that do not require maintenance,
leading to expensive and unnecessary maintenance schedules. In addition, performing
unnecessary maintenance on healthy components can introduce fault catalysts into
previously properly working systems. Conversely, reactive maintenance is performing
maintenance when a system component fails. This maintenance strategy leads to
unplanned and expensive system downtimes [9].
One aspect of PM is to identify sensors that may require maintenance due to
sensor drift or other malfunctions. In PM systems, data collected from plant sensors are
evaluated with empirical and/or physics-based models to obtain an independent
estimate of the actual, un-faulted plant parameter. This estimate is compared to the
sensor signal in order to determine if the sensor has faulted. With this technology,
continuous or near-continuous sensor surveillance is possible. These techniques have
been approved in a general way for nuclear power plants for monitoring and calibration
of safety-critical components and are used extensively in the nuclear power industry
[10].
Adjusting standard PM techniques to monitoring for safeguards relevant
information and combining those techniques with traditional nuclear safeguards offers
the possibility to do real-time or near real time material inventory verification and
instrumentation calibration verification. All available data can be integrated into a
central model. This model can monitor changes in the system configuration, identify
suspect instrumentation, validate operations and monitor equipment, and provide
information for authentication and other decision-making tasks. While research has
examined the potential of PM for nuclear safeguards in a general way, one key
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component missing from published safeguards research is a method to integrate
traditional nuclear safeguards with modern process monitoring techniques for facility
safeguards conclusions. This work attempts to fill that need by developing a PM system
specifically for the nuclear safeguards and for the verification of material processed.
This work presents the research completed to develop a central monitoring system
incorporating traditional nuclear safeguards with modern process monitoring
techniques.

1.1

Problem Statement
The ultimate goal of nuclear safeguards is to validate the amount of material

processed at a facility and to ensure that no material was diverted from its intended
peaceful use. Traditional nuclear safeguards rely heavily on facility and equipment
inspections. Facility inspections require large amounts of manpower, time, and money.
The possibility of remote, continuous or near-continuous monitoring of a facility provides
an efficient way to reduce the burden of facility inspections by taking advantage of the
large amount of data already collected by a facility. Facility data is generally large in
volume but comes from unauthenticated instruments it is not used for safeguards
monitoring. On the other hand, inspector data comes from authenticated instruments
placed at key locations between within the facility and is used in safeguards monitoring.
While several papers have mentioned the possibility of incorporating facility data with
inspector data for safeguards monitoring in a general way, the actual methodology and
quantitative analysis of doing so has been overlooked in published literature.
A major hurdle to incorporating facility data for nuclear safeguards is the volume
of data and its authentication. Most facilities already incorporate different degrees of
PM to efficiently monitor signals from a wide variety of sensors, incorporate correlated
signals into a central monitoring model, and use that model to look for subtle process
changes that may arise from natural events such as sensor drift. For example, consider
a gas flowing through a pipe. Standard instrumentation would include pressure,
temperature, and flow rates. Since these measurements would be correlated with each
other it is possible to build a monitoring model that relates two pressure and
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temperature measurements to the flow rate measurement. By comparing the predicted
flow rate values to the measurement values and tracking the residuals, an operator can
quickly be alerted to changes in the process flow. For example, if the temperature and
pressure measurements remain constant, then the predicted flow rate should remain
constant. If the measured flow rate does not remain constant due to natural sensor
drift, then the residual between the measured flow rate and predicted flow rate would be
non-zero and would alert an operator. In this sense, PM can be viewed as somewhat
self-authenticating, because two independent measurements are used to predict a third
independent measurement. If the predicted value matches the measured value, then
some assurance is provided that all three measurements are correct. As the facility
grows in complexity, the relationships between measurements grow in complexity, and
the effort required to fool the monitoring system grows exponentially.
Traditional safeguards methods are time consuming, tedious, and expensive.
Additionally they ignore the potential information available in the unauthenticated facility
data. Since the large amounts of facility data are already collected, incorporating this
data into safeguards monitoring incurs little financial burden with huge potential gains in
the effectiveness of the monitoring system. The development of automated PM routines
coupled with the possibility of remote data access further reduces the required
manpower to monitor a facility. The focus of this research is developing the
methodology to create a PM system specific to nuclear safeguards incorporating both
unauthenticated facility data with authenticated inspector data. While several different
PM models are available, the auto-associative kernel regression model is used here.
Initially, PM models are developed for a simulated uranium blend-down facility to
determine the sensitivity of the model to detect nuclear material diversions. Then these
algorithms are incorporating into a monitoring system developed for the Oak Ridge
National laboratory (ORNL) mock feed and withdrawal facility. The ORNL facility
mimics a continuous batch feed process, similar to a GCEP, and serves as a test-bed
for the development of a nuclear safeguards monitoring systems. A continuous batch
feed process is a process where containers of feed material, such as a feed cylinder at
a GCEP, are brought into the processing area, the contents of the container are
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processed, the empty container is removed, and then a new container is brought into
the processing area. The monitoring system for the ORNL facility checks the
unauthenticated data for sensor masking and abnormal process operation, and creates
a log of the material processed which can be coupled with traditional inspections to
check for undeclared material processing.

1.2

Original Contributions
The research described herein culminates in several original contributions to the

field of nuclear safeguards monitoring. These contributions lie mainly in the
development of PM algorithms to monitor and validate the material processed at a
nuclear facility. Additionally a graphical user interface (GUI) was developed to aid in the
prototyping of algorithms for safeguards monitoring and material validation. The main
original contributions:
1.

Application of an Auto Associative Kernel Regression (AAKR)
model for continuous or near continuous safeguards monitoring.
These models quantitatively characterize the ability of a monitoring
system to detector sensor masking

2.

Integration of data reconciliation and an AAKR model for
safeguards monitoring.

3.

Development of an automated routine to validate the amount of
material processed at the ORNL facility, including flags alerting an
inspector to abnormal process changes.

4.

Development of a MATLAB-based toolbox and GUI for safeguards
monitoring and material validation at the ORNL facility. The toolbox
and GUI is designed as a tool for potential inspectors to quickly,
and possibly remotely, use facility data to draw safeguards
conclusions.
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1.3

Organization
Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature in process monitoring algorithms and

applications, as well as current methods in nuclear material safeguards monitoring.
Chapter 3 presents the specific problem addressed by this work and the methodology
proposed to solve this problem. Section 3.1 presents a MATLAB Simulink model of a
uranium blend-down monitoring facility. This section also outlines the development of
the safeguards monitoring system using an AAKR model and data reconciliation.
Section 3.2 describes the Oak Ridge National Laboratory mock feed and withdrawal
facility and the components of a load cell monitoring system.
Chapter 4 presents the application and results of the safeguards monitoring
system to the two facilities. Section 4.1 presents the results of incorporating radiation
sensors and data reconciliation into the AAKR architecture for the simulated uranium
blend down facility. Section 4.2 presents the results of the load cell monitoring system
for the ORNL mock feed and withdrawal facility. Section 4.2.4 describes a graphical
user interface implementing the load cell monitoring system developed for the ORNL
facility. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions from this dissertation, a summary of the
contributions, and proposed areas of future work.
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2

LITERATURE SURVEY
Traditional safeguards techniques rely on inspectors performing material

balances between MBAs. MBAs are designated boundaries within a facility, and all
special nuclear material is recorded as it enters and leaves a MBA. The role of
inspectors is to validate MBA measurements and the amount of material within a MBA
as reported by the facility. These safeguards methods are time consuming, tedious,
labor intensive, and expensive. Additionally, these methods are limited in the sensitivity
and speed at which diverted material may be detected. However, incorporating remote
on-line monitoring of a plant has the potential to reduce the burden of IAEA inspectors.
Most facilities incorporate some form of process monitoring already, and while the idea
extending PM techniques for safeguards is not new, little research has been done
develop to explore and quantitatively analyze the benefits of doing so. The basic theory
of process monitoring is to collect measured signal values, use them as input to a
prediction module to create signal predictions, compare the measured signal values to
predicted signal values, and then make decisions based on the residual between the
measured and predicted value, as shown in Figure 2-1. Based on the residual pattern
the decision logic would decide if a sensor had drifted or if there was an abnormal
process happening. Depending on the prediction model and implementation, PM is
very sensitive to small sensor drifts in near real time. In an application to safeguards,
the sensitivity of PM may be useful for detecting small diversion or sensor masking.
The following sections outline the development of PM, including relevant monitoring
models, and then the development of nuclear safeguards, including traditional
safeguards methods and current research in the integration of PM to nuclear
safeguards.

2.1

Process Monitoring (PM)
For successful operation of any process, it is important to detect process upsets,

equipment malfunctions or other special events as early as possible and then to find or
remove the factors causing those events [11]. The earliest forms of process monitoring
(PM) were developed for chemical plants and were referred to as solution monitoring.
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Figure 2-1. The basic structure of a process monitoring model. Measured values are
used to create a prediction of the measured signals, and then the residuals between the
measured and predicted values are used in decision logic.
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Prior to the advent of computer, chemical plants relied on destructive analysis
techniques, detailed and complicated physics models, and highly trained operators to
detect and analysis process upsets. As computers became mainstream and
increasingly exploited for scientific investigation, the field of chemometrics emerged.
Chemometrics is the science of relating measurements made on a chemical system or
process to the state of the system via application of mathematical or statistical methods.
As solution monitoring and chemometrics became more widespread, mostly due to
advances made in both plant instrumentation and in the computer technology that
evaluates it, these techniques were applied to other industries and were more
generically referred to as process monitoring. Many chemical problems and early
applications of chemometrics involve calibration. Using multivariate statistical
techniques, fast, cheap, and non-destructive analytical measurements can be used to
estimate sample properties that would otherwise require time-consuming, expensive,
destructive testing. As plants become more heavily instrumented, the ability to identify
sensors that have fallen out of calibration is increasingly important. As computer
technology continued to evolve, newer PM techniques were developed to assist
condition monitoring (CM) of plant equipment in real time or near-real time. These
techniques are commonly referred to as On-Line Monitoring (OLM) methods [15].
CM can be divided into two major tasks: state estimation and state monitoring.
State estimation refers to estimating the current condition, or state, or a system
component. Three techniques are generally used in state estimation: redundant signal
monitoring, reference signal monitoring, and diverse signal monitoring. State estimation
using redundant signals takes the average sensor reading when a large number of
redundant signals are available and uses that average sensor reading as an estimate of
the system state. State estimation using reference signals involves comparing a
sensor's response to a calibrated reference signal to distinguish between sensor drive
and process drive. The third technique, state estimation using diverse signals, is useful
when a large number of redundant sensors are not available. Instead of determining
the system state from a set of redundant signals or a reference signal, the system state
is determined from other system sensors that are correlated with the sensor being
10

monitored. This technique is generally more practical than installing a large number of
redundant sensors and relies heavily on multivariate modeling.
Multivariate modeling can be further divided into physical modeling and empirical
modeling. Physical modeling relies on knowledge of the physics of the system to
predict system states. For instance, by measuring the temperature of a gas in a known
volume, the pressure of the gas can be predicted based on established physic relations
of gas pressure and temperature. While physical modeling has the advantage that it
allows one to predict future system states for a new process operation, it has the
disadvantage that it requires detailed knowledge of the physics particular to the system.
Alternatively, empirical modeling does not require knowledge of the system's physics,
and it does not provide any analyzable relationships between system parameters.
Instead, empirical modeling compares current operating conditions to past operating
conditions to determine the expected current condition. As chemical facilities grew in
size and complexity, empirical models became more widespread for process monitoring
due to the difficulty of developing detailed physics models. The disadvantage of
empirical modeling is that its predictive range is limited by the past operating conditions.
If a new process condition is encountered that is significantly different from the past
operating history, the empirical model will be unable to predict the new operating
condition. However, as data exemplifying the new operating condition is appended to
the known past operating condition, model predictions become more reliable.
Historically, these techniques have been applied specifically for condition
monitoring in maintenance scheduling [9, 13]. Recently, a three volume NUREG/CR6895 series [14-16] was developed for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
provide background, technical guidance and explore implementation issues related to
the use of PM for the extension of safety critical sensor calibration intervals. One
application of implementing OLM methods is summarized in [14]. Nuclear power
utilities began investigating and developing OLM methods that would allow them to
move away from periodic maintenance strategies towards condition-based maintenance
philosophies. Traditionally manual calibration of nuclear instruments is required through
regulation and is performed during each nuclear power plant refueling outage. There
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are several weaknesses associated with manual calibration that could be addressed
with OLM methods. Manual calibration is the practice of having personnel periodically
recalibrate instrumentation regardless of their condition. Previous studies have shown
that between calibration periods less than 5% of the 50 to 150 calibrated instruments
have fallen out of calibration. Therefore, during a refueling outage around 95% of the
calibrations are unnecessary, and performing unnecessary maintenance on properly
working equipment provides opportunities for faults to enter the system. Additionally, if
a sensor falls out of calibration it remains undetected until the next calibration period.
An OLM method could continuously monitor the instrument channel and identify which
sensors have degraded. The identified sensors could be identified as needing
calibration at the next outage or as entirely inoperable depending on the amount of
degradation. Identifying only the instruments that need calibration would reduce the
amount of maintenance required during an outage and would limit the opportunity to
introduce faults by performing unnecessary maintenance on working equipment.
Implementing OLM methods would allow a plant to move develop a condition-based
maintenance schedule rather than a periodic maintenance schedule, providing
advantages such as reduced radiation exposure, increased instrument reliability, and
increased equipment availability.
2.1.1 Parametric Models
There are two common empirical model architectures: parametric and nonparametric. Parametric models identify a set of parameters to define the functional
relationship of the system. An example of a common parametric model is linear
regression:
(2.1)
Where

is the prediction,

is the nth parameter,

is the nth input, and

is an

error term. The error term is not a fitted parameter of the model, rather it identifies the
error between the prediction, , and the measurement. For several linear regression
models, this equation can be written more compactly in matrix form as:
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(2.2)
Where

(2.3)

Parametric models use historical plant data to create a model training data set
and then optimize the parameters (in the case of linear regression, each ) of a
predefined mathematical function. The mathematical function used as the prediction
model does not need to be linear and will depend on the system being modeled. For
instance, population growth is generally modeled with the Malthusian Growth Model,
which assumes a mathematical model of the form:
(2.4)
Where

is the predicted population,

parameter to be fit,

is the time, and

is the initial population,

is an error term [18].

is the

is a measure of growth

rate with respect to time. The parameters are normally optimized by minimizing an
objective function. For linear regression, the objective function is the sum of the
squared error. Once the parameters have been optimized, the model training set is no
longer useful, and only the optimized parameters and the predefined mathematical
function are saved. When a new query is made, the measured sensor values are fit to
the mathematical function, using the previously optimized parameters, and the residual
between the new prediction and the measured value are fed to the decision logic. For
example, in equation 2.4, once

is optimized (

, the initial parameter is known and the

error term not included when making predictions), all future predictions rely only on

,

, and and not the data that was used to optimize . Once a parametric model has
been defined, the model is inflexible unless a new training data set becomes available
and either the mathematical function is updated and/or the parameters are re-optimized
based on the new training set. More information about different parametric models,
including models of higher complexity, is available in [19-22].
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2.1.2 Kernel Regression
Kernel Regression is an empirical, non-parametric modeling technique. A nonparametric model uses historical data to build a local model. It differs from a parametric
model in that every time a new estimation is made, a new model is built from the
historical data. Essentially a non-parametric model creates a temporary parametric
model, optimizes the temporary parametric model parameters using historical data
similar to the input signals, uses the optimized temporary parametric model to perform
predictions, and then discards the temporary parametric model. When a new set of
input signals is available, the process repeats. The process of using a parametric and
non-parametric prediction model is outlined in Figure 2-2. Instead of saving a set of
parameters, a non-parametric model saves the historical data and parameters are reoptimized for every prediction and then discarded after every prediction. In the case of
kernel regression, instead of creating a temporary parametric model, a prediction is
performed using a weighted sum of historical values. Kernel regression can be formally
defined as the process of estimation using a weighted average of historical exemplar
observations [23]:
An important first step creating a kernel regression model is selecting which data
should become part of the model training data set. Only historical data that is a close
representation of the query data becomes part of the model training data set.
Determining the similarity between the query data and the historical data is performed
through a distance function. The most common distance function is the Euclidean
distance, also known as the L2-norm, and is given by:
(2.5)
The distance between every historical data record and the query vector is calculated,
and the historical data records with the minimum distance are used in the model training
set. While the L2-norm is the most common distance measure, several more robust
distance measures have been explored, including the L1-norm [24].
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Figure 2-2. Outline of a parametric and non-parametric empirical model. A parametric
model optimizes parameters of a mathematical model once and then uses those
parameters for each subsequent prediction. The model training data set is not saved
for future use. A non-parametric model uses historical operation data to build a
parametric model for each prediction. Each new prediction requires a new parametric
model, and the optimized parameters are not saved. The historical operation data is
saved, but the set of optimized parametric parameters is discarded after predictions are
made.
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In Kernel regression, estimation is performed based on a weighted average of
similar historical data. Once the model training data set has been selected, each record
in the model training data set is assigned a weight. Records that are very similar to the
query vector (and, therefore, have a small distance) should receive a very high weight,
while less similar records should receive a smaller weight. The most commonly used
kernel function is the Gaussian Kernel, given by [25]:

(2.6)
Where h is the kernel's bandwidth. The bandwidth determines how small the distance,
d, must be in order to generate a large weight. A smaller bandwidth will only generate
high weights when the distance is close to zero. The bandwidth is usually chosen to
minimize model uncertainty, given by:
.

(2.7)

The effects of over or under estimating the bandwidth can be seen in Figure 2-3, and a
properly sized bandwidth is shown in Figure 2-4. Too large of a bandwidth can result in
a larger prediction bias, and too small of a bandwidth will increase the prediction
variance. The bandwidth is generally optimized so that the quadratic sum of the bias
and prediction uncertainty is minimized. The Gaussian kernel is only one example of a
kernel function. Other kernel functions include inverse distance, exponential, absolute
exponential, uniform weighting, triangular, biquadratic, and tricube [23]. While other
kernel functions may perform better in specific applications, the Gaussian kernel is
generally adequate.
Because the kernel regression, and empirical modeling in general, does not
require detailed knowledge of a facility can be easily applied to several different types of
facilities. Historically, it was used in large chemical facilities. These facilities are highly
instrumented and the relationships between measurements are often non-linear and too
complex for the development a physical model. However, kernel regression can be
used in any situation where a physical model isn't available. For instance, reference
16
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Figure 2-3. The effect of incorrect Gaussian Kernel bandwidth selection. Too large of a
bandwidth (top) results in a larger range of distances receiving a non-trivial weight,
which can introduce a large prediction bias, where the peaks and values of the data are
not well fit. Too small of a bandwidth (bottom) results in large weights only when the
distance is small, and can introduce a large variance [26]. An optimal bandwidth
minimizes the model uncertainty.
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Figure 2-4. A properly sized bandwidth balances the effect of prediction bias and model
variance. The result is that the peaks and values of the function are well fit and that the
overall model uncertainty is minimized [26].
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[17] describes the use of various ecological variables, such as temperature, wind speed,
precipitation, and relative humidity to predict the area burned in wildfires.
2.1.3 Data Reconciliation
Data reconciliation (DR) is a measurement correction technique based on the
known physical laws of system and the instrument uncertainties. Known material and
energy balances serve as additional constraints to improve measurement accuracy by
reducing random errors associated with measurements. DR produces reconciled (or
corrected) estimates that are consistent with the known material and energy
conservation laws and are inherently more accurate when no systematic error exists
[14]. An example would be liquid transfer between two tanks. Under normal operation
the liquid leaving tank 1 must enter tank 2; however, because of random measurement
error, the measured amount of liquid leaving tank 1 and entering tank 2 may not be
exactly equal. DR would reconcile the two measurement values so that the measured
values would be equal.
The first application of DR was by Kuehn and Davidson [27] of the IMB
Corporation. Kuehn used DR on a linear material balance system in which all
parameters were measured. DR has since been applied to dynamic processes [28],
non-linear models [29], and recently to processes that are both dynamic and non-linear
[30].
DR can generally be written as a constrained, weighted, least squares
optimization problem:

(2.8)
where

is the reconciled value,

is the measurement, and

is the measurement

standard deviation. The weights are proportional to the inverse of each measurement's
accuracy. Most DR techniques assume that measurements contain only a random error
component with a Gaussian distribution. If systematic errors exist, DR may reconcile
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the measurements in such a way that the reconciled values are more inaccurate than
the raw measurements [31]. Therefore, systematic error detection techniques are
generally coupled with DR to remove and eliminate systematic errors.
As an example of DR, consider a simple flow splitter, shown in Figure 2-5. In this
system, under normal operation, the mass flow out of M1 must equal the mass flow into
M2 and M3. However, because every measurement has some random noise, the
measured values will not exactly obey the physical relationship that M1 = M2 + M3. DR
is used to calculate a correlation factor that is applied to the measured value so that
they obey the physical relationship. The corrected values are referred to as reconciled
values.
Data reconciliation calculates a correction factor, , that is applied to measured
values to force the system to follow known conservation laws. The relationship between
the reconciled values and the measured values is given by:
(2.9)
where

is the reconciled values,

is the measured values, and

is the corrective

factor to be determined. The corrective factor is applied to the measured values to
force the measured values to follow conservation laws, such as M1 = M2 + M3. The
solution to equation 2.8 requires
for

, and

for

to be minimized. In matrix notation, and substituting

, the objective function can be expressed as:
(2.10)

where

is the vector of corrective factors,

is a diagonal matrix of

. For a first

order, linear system the minimizing solution, through the application of Lagrange
multipliers, is :

(2.11)
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Figure 2-5. Diagram of a simple flow splitter. In this system the mass flow out of M1
must equal the mass flow into M2 and M3. However, due to random measurement
error, the measured mass flow rate may not exactly represent the relationship M1 = M2
+ M3. Data Reconciliation is used to calculate a correction factor to the measured
values so that they obey the physical relationship.
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The correction factors are weighted by both the standard deviation and the magnitude
of the measurement value. So measurements with higher precision, and therefore
alower , have a lower . Equation 2.11 is substituted into equation 2.8, which is then
used to reconcile the measured values. A summary of applying this correction factor to
the hypothetical system in Figure 2-5 is shown in Table 2-1.
The data in Table 2-1 shows that the measured values of M1, M2, and M3 do not obey
the conservation law initially, but after applying data reconciliation the reconciled values
do obey the mass conservation law.. Also the size of the correction factor is related to
both the standard deviation and the magnitude of the measured values, which explains
why M1 had a much larger correction factor that either M2 or M3. It is important to note
that DR assumes the data is under normal operation, the sensors are not faulted, and
the conservation laws are actually true (which would not the case in a division scenario).
If these assumptions are not met, DR can actually increase the error and uncertainty of
the measured values [31]. In this sense, DR can be thought of as a de-noising
technique which relates the measured values to their most likely true values (i.e.
removes the random noise component).
Data reconciliation was first applied only to linear processes, such as mass
balance problems seen in almost all types of nuclear facilities. As the techniques
matured, the areas of application increased. For instance, data reconciliation is used in
several types of power plants (coal, nuclear, natural gas, etc.) where both non-linear
and dynamic processes take place, such as plant start-up, load changing, and energy
balances within a combustion chamber. Specific to nuclear power plants, data
reconciliation has successfully been used to reconcile flow rates into and out of the
reactor core to provide a better measurement of reactor power, which enables the plant
to operate closer to its maximum capacity throughout the entire year [14].
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Table 2-1. An application of data reconciliation to a hypothetical flow splitter. The
physical system is constrained by M1 = M2+M3, but due to measurement error the
measured values do not exactly obey the constraining law. Data reconciliation is used
to calculate a correction factor for each measured value (weighted by both the
magnitude of the measured value and the standard deviation of the measurement), to
force the measured values to follow the conservation law.
Sensor

Measured Value, f(x)

M1
M2
M3
M1-M2-M3

500
245
250
5

Standard
Deviation
25
12.25
12.5

Correction
Factor (v)
-3.36
0.81
0.84

23

Reconciled
Value, f(xbar)
496.64
245.81
250.84
0

2.1.4 Sequential Probability Ratio Test
The sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) is a sequential hypothesis test used
as a fault detection technique that was developed by Abraham Wald [36]. The SPRT is
useful for determining if a sequence of residuals indicates the system is in a degraded
state. The sequences of residuals being generated by a random process (such as
measurement noise) should have a mean of zero, but if the system is degraded there
will be a shift in the mean or variance of the residuals. The SPRT determines whether a
sequence of residuals indicates a faulted condition by calculating the log likelihood ratio.
According to the central limit theorem, the measurement residuals can be assumed to
be normally distributed. Using this assumption, the SPRT determines whether or not a
sequence of numbers comes from a specified normal distribution or not. In the case of
fault detection, the unfaulted normal distribution’s mean and variance would be
determined by training the model. In this case the SPRT determines whether or not the
sequence of residuals comes from unfaulted normal distribution. If the sequence fails
the SPRT, then the data is in a faulted state. Complete derivation of the log likelihood
ratios is outside the scope of this work, but it can be found in [35]. The SPRT
determines how small of a drift can be detected with a specified false alarm rate by
calculating:
(2.12)
where

is the mean,

is the residual at time m, and

is the variance. If

is within

certain bounds, then the residuals are said to come from unfaulted data. The bounds
are calculated by specifying a false alarm rate,

and missed alarm rate, .
(2.13)

(2.14)
If

is less than A, then the residuals are said to come from unfaulted data, if

than B, the data is assumed faulted. If

is greater

is between A and B the test is inconclusive.
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2.2

Nuclear Safeguards
The initial development of nuclear technology was for military purposes. After

World War II, the attention of nuclear technology turned to civil applications. Nuclear
safeguards refers to the development of technology and policy to assure that special
nuclear material is used for its intended peaceful applications. In 1953, in his "Atoms for
Peace" address to the UN General Assembly, Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the
creation of an international body to both regulate and promote the peaceful use of
atomic power [18]. In the following year, the United States proposed the creation of an
international agency to take control of all fissile material and serve as a nuclear bank
[36]. From this proposal the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was born.
However, international disagreements prevented the IAEA from becoming the nuclear
bank originally proposed. Instead, the IAEA became tasked with ensuring that nuclear
material is not diverted from its intended peaceful uses. To this end, the IAEA is
charged with: the inspection of facilities to ensure their peaceful use, providing
information and developing standards to ensure the safety and security of nuclear
facilities, and as a scientific center for fields involving the peaceful application of nuclear
technology.
Parties who have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are required
to enter a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The NPT is a treaty to limit the spread,
or proliferation, of nuclear weapons. The treaty first came into effect in March of 1970.
The NPT is generally interpreted as a three-pillar system: non-proliferation,
disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. The first pillar states
that the recognized nuclear states will not transfer nuclear weapons technology to nonnuclear weapon states or encourage non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear
weapons and that non-nuclear weapon states will not seek to acquire or manufacture
nuclear weapons. The second pillar is to reduce the worldwide stockpile of nuclear
weapons. The third pillar recognizes that non-nuclear weapon states have the right to
peacefully use nuclear technology.
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The basic measure by which the IAEA verifies the fulfillment of the NPT
obligations is through nuclear material accountancy [3]. The availability of fissile
material has long been considered the principal obstacle to a country's nuclear weapons
development effort. The spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology allows
countries to develop their own nuclear technology for the peaceful purposes stated in
the NPT, but it also inherently gives those countries the capabilities of producing fissile
material for weapons development. The IAEA routinely performs safeguards activities
at over 900 facilities in over 71 countries, including power reactors, research reactors,
conversion plants, fuel fabrication plants, enrichment plants, storage facilities and
reprocessing plants, in addition to other facilities [37].
Traditional safeguards rely on defining MBAs within a plant and tracking the
material flow between MBAs. Periodically, full inventories are conducted to verify the
amount of material within a MBA rather than just the amount of material entering and
leaving a MBA. Since most facilities deal with uniquely labeled components, such as
fuel assemblies, and the nuclear components are not easily subdivided, simple ensuring
tracking the component as a whole is a sufficient accountability measure. However,
GCEPs and reprocessing plants are unique in that they don’t deal with uniquely labeled
components. Special nuclear material is mixed and divided throughout the plants and
proper MCA requires taking measurements at key locations at the boundaries of MBAs
[7, 8]. A sample MBA for a GCEP is shown in Figure 2-6. Typical key measurements
include concentrations, isotopic compositions, and volume, density and/or weight.
Instrumentation and measurement techniques including alpha spectrometry,
calorimetry, chemical titration, K-edge absorption densitometry, manometers and
vibrating-tube densitometers, neutron techniques, spectrophotometry, uranium
gravimetry, mass spectrometry, x-ray fluorescence, and gamma-ray spectrometry [7].
Material inventory must be accounted for to within one significant quantity of material
within an appropriate time period [6].
The Rokkasho plant in Japan is a commercial-sized reprocessing plant. It will
have the capacity to reprocess 800 metric tons of spent fuel a year. The average spent
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Figure 2-6. Block diagram of material flow through a hypothetical gas enrichment plant.
As material is received, its contents are verified and it is put into storage. When
material is ready to be processed, it is moved from storage to an input accountability
tank, thereby crossing from MBA 1 to MBA 2. After the material is processed, it is
removed from the process line and placed in storage, thereby crossing from MBA 2 to
MBA 3, where it stays until it is shipped offsite. At each MBA crossing, the MCA is done
through destructive assay and key flow measurements.
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fuel is approximately 0.9% plutonium by weight, meaning that the plutonium throughput
is 7.2 metric tons per year. Assuming a realistic measurement uncertainty of 1.0%, 72
kg of plutonium falls within the annual 1-sigma error bounds [7]. A significant quantity of
plutonium is defined as 8 kg, so the Rokkasho plant must perform a monthly plutonium
inventory balance to keep the 1-sigma error bound below a significant quantity.
Regardless of measurement uncertainty, a high enough material throughputs could
force a facility to perform more frequent inventory balances to ensure the 1-sigma error
bound stays below a significant quantity of material.
As commercial plants continue to spread and grow in size, eventually plant
throughput will reach a point that even monthly inventory balances will not have the
precision to account for one significant quantity of material. Also, no additional
verification is performed to ensure cumulative uncertainties don’t reach a significant
quantity. Improvements in measurement precision will reduce the material uncertainty,
but many of the more accurate classical techniques have a long wait time (3 – 4
months) due to transportation of samples off-site and the time it takes to do the
analysis. For these reasons, many experts have called for improvements in safeguards
methods to reconcile these and other difficulties and uncertainties [38-40].
Many of the improvements envisioned require drastic increases in manpower,
technology or both. Shortening the material accountancy period or increasing the
number of material balance areas requires many more person-hours to accomplish a
timely analysis. Currently, the Rokkasho reprocessing plant requires between 1000
and 1200 Person Days of Inspection (PDI) out of the approximately 10,000 PDIs
deployed by the IAEA’s Safeguards Department worldwide [7]. A standard GCEP
requires an annual inspection with 2-4 IAEA inspectors and monthly interim inspections
is 1-2 inspectors. The annual inspection may take between 10 and 15 days, while the
monthly interim inspection only requires at most 4 days. Additional process information
would provide inspectors means for verifying the process and preventing diversion of
nuclear material, without the need for drastic increases in manpower or technology [38].
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2.2.1 Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards
While a number of evaluation systems have been developed, process monitoring
for safeguards is still in its infancy. Certain systems, through experiences on real
facilities, are evolving algorithms useful for evaluating real-world scenarios rather than
idealized simulations [41, 42]. The two types of facilities most examined are a gas
centrifuge enrichment plant and reprocessing plants.
Process monitoring as an international safeguards tool has its root in the late
1970s. Prior to the 1970s, reprocessing plants were small and limited to the nuclear
weapon states. By the late 1970s, the Tokai Reprocessing Plant is Japan was nearing
completion and there was the possibility of a large-scale commercial reprocessing plant
at Barnwell in the United States. Several countries with reprocessing technology,
including France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, joined the
IAEA in the Tokai Advanced Safeguards Exercise (TASTEX) to investigate advanced
techniques to improve international safeguards capabilities for larger commercial plants.
One of the recommendations was for the implementation of process monitoring.
Research originated at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to detect valve setting
errors and prevent inadvertent transfers between tanks [12]. The nature of the
instrumentation of the Tokai made interfacing for digital data collection difficult.
However, the Barnwell plant was built with more modern instrumentation, including a
computer-based data collection system, so development of process monitoring
continued at that facility. Further development continued at the Integrated Equipment
Test (IET) facility at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, but the reprocessing equipment
developed there was never intended for commercial operation. The earliest efforts of
process monitoring were referred to as solution monitoring because they concentrated
on monitoring vessel volumes and the flow of solution between tanks. The development
of process evaluation software lagged significantly behind. However, research at
Barnwell and at the EIT tried to predict special nuclear material concentrations based on
density measurements and some acid concentration measurements [54].
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Until the early 1990's, the techniques developed under TASTEX remained the
international standard. Applications expanded slightly as the scope of facility operations
expanded, but measurement and data-collection was patterned after the Tokai system.
All data was collected on-site and for the most part evaluation was based on the
capabilities of the inspector to use packaged graphical interface routines. Without the
development of process evaluation software, the inspectors were left with a wealth of
data but very limited ways to efficiently analyze it. However, in the early 2000's an IAEA
and Glasgow University collaboration made significant progress in evaluation software.
The software was used to extract pertinent features of the data, observe specific plant
operations, and to detect and isolate anomalies. It still required that knowledgeable
inspectors interact with qualitative graphical representations, but it also represented the
first real effort to provide inspectors with both quantitative and partially diagnosed
information [54].
Currently, France, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom operate commercial
reprocessing plants, but only the Japanese plants at Rokkasho and Tokai fall under
IAEA safeguards. In existing reprocessing plants, operators have extensive and cutting
edge systems for monitoring and control including cameras, tamper-indicating devices,
radiation detectors, and the typical process control instrumentation. While this broad
range of data could provide very detailed information for the purposes of verification,
operators have traditionally been reluctant to allow the IAEA access to the data due to
concerns about revealing proprietary information [12].
The first application of process monitoring for safeguards was in reprocessing
facilities, but in the early 1970's GCEPs were also a major concern. Initially safeguards
at GCEPs did not involve access to the cascades halls. Recognizing the minimal effort
required for a commercial GCEP to be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium,
the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) convened in the early 1980's with the
objective of developing an effective safeguards approach for GCEPs. The HSP
approach combined traditional nuclear accountancy measures outside the cascade hall
with limited frequency, unannounced access (LFUA) to the cascade hall. The traditional
measures outside the cascade hall mainly consisted of weight measurements of the
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feed, tail, and product tanks in addition to the verification that the accountability scales
are properly calibrated. Inside the cascade, measures included non-destructive assay
measurements on piping within the cascade hall and visual observation to verify design
information. In the early 1990's, gas centrifuge technology reached a stage where
higher enrichment levels could be produced without visible changes to the cascade
design, leading to the development of a continuous enrichment monitoring system
comparable in purpose to the process monitoring systems developed for reprocessing
facilities [45].
Safeguards at GCEPs focus on determining whether or not undeclared uranium
is being enriched. The most prevalent method is through load cell monitoring to verify
nuclear material accountancy. The proposed systems analyze cylinder weight data that
is collected frequently from cylinders located in feed, tails, and product stations.
Research exploring PM at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants for the detection of
undeclared production by monitoring the enrichment cascade and the load cell stations
is described in [43-48]. A typical load cell profile is shown in Figure 2-7.
The profile shown in Figure 2-7 lacks any noise components that would be seen
in an actual plant. An actual load cell profile would be contaminated with noise, most
significantly seen as a period of instability when a tank is first loaded or removed.
Material accountancy is then simply implemented using:

2.10

where ID is the inventory difference,
weights for all the feed stations,
weights for all product stations, and

is the summation of the change of tank
is the summation of the change of tanks
the summation of the change of tanks

weights for all tail stations. When the plant inventory is perfectly balanced, ID will equal
zero. In reality, all plant experience varying amount of material holdup in pipes, valves,
and other components, so that ID is never zero. However, by characterizing the
31

Figure 2-7. A hypothetical load cell profile as a feed tank is loaded, processed, and
removed from a GCEP feed station. At an actual plant, the profile would be
contaminated with noise spikes, most significantly when a tank is first loaded or
removed.
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expected facility holdup, equation 2.10 can be expanded to include a facility holdup
term and a more meaningful value for ID is achieved.
Accurately determining

,

, and

first requires that the

load cell data can be matched to a template to accurately identify the number of
cylinders placed on a feed, tail, or product station. Then correctly identifying the initial
and final tank weights is used to determine the material throughput. Currently, the IAEA
does not make use of load cell data for safeguard purposes, instead relying solely on
authenticated accountability scales. Incorporating load cell data with authenticated
accountability measurements provides a measure of validation that no undeclared
material was processed. However, operators have two key concerns: the unnecessary
transmission of data out of a facility, and unnecessary inspector access to detailed
process monitoring. In response to these concerns, algorithms have been proposed to
automatically and locally count the number of cylinders at a GCEP station, thereby
limiting the transmission of data offsite.
An outline using template matching to count the number of cylinders processed
at a load cell station is summarized from John Howell's paper entitled "Algorithms to
Count the Cylinder Throughput of a GCEP Feed Station" [49]. For this template
matching procedure, it is assumed that the GCEP operator will allow local automated
feed cylinder counting from their load cell data, but that the operator is under no
obligation to operate a facility in a prescribed manner. For instance, the operator may:
(1) place a part-filled cylinder into a station, (2) temporarily halt station output, (3)
remove a cylinder before it is completely empty, or (4) vary the rate at which a cylinder
is emptied. The load cell data would consist of load cell weights collected frequently
and at regular intervals. This data would be saved locally in a fixed format. The
counting algorithms would search through the data and extract the approximate times
when cylinders were changed and their initial and final weight. The basic profile of a
feed station was shown in Figure 2-7. The basic profile changes under different
operations are shown in Figure 2-8.
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Figure 2-8. Changes in a GCEP feed station profile under different operating conditions.
The spikes when a tank is added or removed from the scale represent expected
fluctuations.
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The template outlined from Howell’s paper [49] is shown in Figure 2-9. Section A marks
the period when a cylinder is emptying, which is a function of the feed rate (possibly
unspecified and varying), the initial cylinder weight, and the final cylinder weight.
Section B marks the period when an empty cylinder still resides on the station load
cells. Section C marks the delay before a new feed cylinder is placed on the station.
Section D marks the period when a new cylinder is first placed on the station and the
weight value is still fluctuating. Section E marks the period when a new cylinder is
ready to be emptied. The weight value may fluctuate due to various processes
associated with bringing a new cylinder online. With the exception of section A, all other
sections would be of concern only to the operator, since section A contains all the
information about the amount of material processed and the initial and final tank weight.
Each template would be specified using predefined parameters corresponding to
a weight threshold, a change of weight threshold, a time threshold, or a combination of
all three. For instance, section C is specified by setting a lower weight threshold
corresponding to an empty scale weight (with some error allowance for measurement
noise) and a length of time that the feed station must remain in section C. Section B
could then be specifying that a lower threshold associated with the weight of an empty
tank and by specifying that the data is not in section A, D, or E. Additional templates
would be created for partially filled cylinders being placed on the station or for a cylinder
being withdrawn prematurely. Once the templates have been matched, the number of
cylinders processed can easily and automatically be counted by counting the number of
times a specific template has been matched. With this automated system, the need for
manual analysis would be limited to cases where the number of cylinders reported is not
in agreement with the number of cylinders declared by the operator.
Cylinder counting could be used as part of a wider scheme that collects, analyzes and
integrates data from the load cells, accountancy weigh scales, and other key
measurements taken in the facility. Several key processes are already collected by the
operator for use in process monitoring, but are not specifically available to the IAEA for
safeguards. Research in safeguards at reprocessing facilities has focused on solution
monitoring. Solution monitoring is a specific form of process monitoring for
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Figure 2-9. A general feed template for a GCEP feed station. Section A marks the
period when a cylinder is emptying. Section B marks the period when an empty cylinder
still resides on the station load cells. Section C marks the delay before a new feed
cylinder is placed on the station. Section D marks the period when a new cylinder is
first placed on the station, and the weight value is still fluctuating. Section E marks the
period when a new cylinder is ready to be emptied [49].
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chemical facilities. As material is transferred from one process tank to the next, process
variables are recorded. The standard process measurements are level, density and
temperature of a solution tank. Several of these measurements are highly correlated
with the flow of SNM through a facility and therefore could naturally lend themselves to
drawing safeguards conclusions. For example, consider the three tank example outline
in [50]. In this example, a generic feed, accountability, and buffer tank are connected in
series, as shown in Figure 2-10. Suppose that flow rates F11 and F12 into the feed tank,
F21 and F22 into the accountability tank, and F31 and F32 into the buffer tank and F41 out
of the buffer tank are measured in real time and recorded every 5 minutes. The
temperature (Co), density ( ), and level (which is calibrated to the volume V), are also
recorded every 5 minutes. Different assumptions regarding the availability of
measurements of the nitric acid concentration H, the Plutonium concentration Pu, and
the Uranium concentration U can be examined. Typically concentrations are not
measured in-line, but rather by taking a stream sample and analyzing it.
Traditional nuclear materials accountability would compare the SNM mass
entering the feed tank with the SNM mass exiting the buffer tank. The throughput in
tank 2 would be ignored. The inventory difference for the material balance is defined
as:
2.11
Where Tin and Tout are transfers into and out of the tank, and Ibegin and Iend are the
beginning and ending material inventory (or level) in the tank. The inventory difference
reported by the operator, IDoperator, is calculated using equation 2.11. However, it is not
feasible for an inspector to re-measure every tank. Therefore the inspector will select a
random subset of tanks from. The inspector will then independently measure each of
those tanks and compare them to the operator's measurement. A difference statistic, D,
is calculate by:
2.12
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Figure 2-10. A generic feed, accountability, and Buffer tank connected in series [50]. A
material balance area surrounds the three tanks. The flow rates are denoted by F, the
temperature by Co, the density by , and the volume by V. Measurements of the nitric
acid concentration, plutonium concentration, and uranium concentration are denoted by
H, Pu, and U respectively [50].
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Where N is the total number of tanks, n is the subsample size, oj is the operator's
measurement of sample j, and ij is the inspector's measurement of sample j. The
inventory difference as calculated by the inspector is then expressed as:
2.13
One limitation of this approach is that the uncertainty of IDoperator is generally smaller
(due in part to the larger number of measurements available) than the uncertainty of D
and therefore the uncertainty of IDinspector. This lower uncertainty of IDoperator means that
the operator is better able to detect diversions compared with an inspector. For
example, at the Rokkasho plant 12 important vessels are equipped with instruments
installed and controlled by the IAEA (in addition to instruments installed by the operator)
to make independent and externally authenticated measurements (for use in calculating
the D statistic). However, approximately 80 vessels only use operator's instruments
and, therefore, are not authenticated. Process monitoring provides a means to
incorporate unauthenticated operator data with authenticated inspector data to lower the
uncertainty of IDinspector and therefore increase the detection probability of unauthorized
activity. In the three tank example, errors from one measurement would be correlated
with errors in subsequent measurements. For example, if the measured flow rate F21
into tank two is too high (meaning the actual flow rate into tank two is lower than
measured), then the predicted volume in tank 1 would be too small, but the predicted
value in tank 2 would be too high. Monitoring these errors using multivariate statistical
methods could ensure that the 3 tanks are operated as declared, providing a measure
of authentication of each of the operator's measurement. In this sense, process
monitoring is self-authenticating. Several other examples of solution monitoring for
safeguards are available in [51-53].
Applying process monitoring techniques to safeguards measurements provides a
cost-effective way to reduce the burden of IAEA inspectors. Using the selfauthenticating nature of process monitoring, the need for additionally independent and
externally authenticated measurements is reduced and provides a possible way for
remote monitoring of a facility. Additionally, more sophisticated monitoring techniques
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would lower the uncertainty of IDinspector which could translate into extending the
intervals between inspections, further reducing the IAEA manpower needed to monitor a
single facility.
While initial safeguards approaches for reprocessing facilities and for GCEPs
had different focuses and specific techniques, several of the techniques are equally
applicable for both facilities. For example, the load cell algorithms developed for GCEP
monitoring could be applied to tank monitoring at reprocessing facilities, and the
solution monitoring techniques developed for reprocessing facilities could be adapted to
monitor the gas flow inside a GCEP cascade hall. While on-line monitoring has been
well established in other areas, its application to nuclear safeguards is still new. Current
research implementing process monitoring for safeguards at both reprocessing facilities
and GCEPs is being conducted by Tom Burr of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and
John Howell of the University of Glasgow, UK. Several other laboratories and agencies
are involved in this research including: the Oak Ridge National Laboratory [56 - 59],
The U.S. Department of Energy, The International Atomic Energy Agency, and the
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Technology Center, Japan. A complete review on PM for
safeguards, including international collaborations, is available in [54, 55].
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3

METHODOLOGY
Traditional safeguards techniques rely on material accountancy. Improvements

in monitoring techniques can reduce the burden of IAEA inspectors by extending the
interval between inspections [38]. Historically, process monitoring techniques have
been applied specifically for condition monitoring for maintenance scheduling [9, 13].
More recently a three volume NUREG/CR-6895 series [14-16] was developed for the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide background, technical guidance and
explore implementation issues related to the use of PM for the extension of safety
critical sensor calibration intervals. The application and expansion of PM techniques for
safeguards could provide a framework for reducing the burden on IAEA inspectors
without compromising their nuclear safeguards mission.

3.1

Safeguards Monitoring of a Simulated Uranium Blend-Down

Facility
The second pillar of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty calls for a reduction in
the number of nuclear warheads held by the nuclear states. To this end, the United
States and Russia signed an HEU Purchase Agreement in 1993. Under this
agreement, Russia would dismantle part of their nuclear stockpile, blend-down their
highly enriched uranium (HEU) components to reactor grade uranium (approximately
4% 235U enriched), and sell the reactor grade uranium to the United States as reactor
fuel. The Blend-Down Monitoring System (BDMS) was designed to provide verification
that the requirements of the HEU Purchase agreement were being met. To monitor the
235

U flow, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) developed the Fissile Mass Flow

Meter (FMFM). The FMFM measures the delayed gammas from induced fissions of
235

U. Figure 3-1 shows a schematic of the FMFM used in the BDMS. THE FMFM is a

two part system. The first part is a neutron source assembly. The FMFM neutron
source is a Californium-252 used to induce fissions in a uranium hexafluoride stream.
The source is incased in polyethylene to moderate the source neutrons. During
operation a shutter is opened to allow moderated neutrons to enter uranium
hexafluoride stream and induce fissions. The second part of the assembly is a shielded
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Figure 3-1. A schematic of the Fissile Mass Flow Meter (FMFM) used in the blend-down
monitoring system. When the shutter is opened a Californium-252 neutron source
induces fissions in a uranium hexafluoride stream. Downstream of the neutron source
is a shielded detector array used to detect delayed gammas from Uranium-235 fission.
The number of delayed gammas detected is proportional to the amount of Uranium-235
in the stream. The time delay between the source shutter opening and the initial
detection of fission gammas can be used to calculate the flow velocity.
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detector located downstream from the neutron source. The delayed gammas from
Uranium-235 fission are detected as the stream passes the detector. The number of
delayed gammas detected is proportional to the amount of Uranium-235 in the stream.
The signal from the FMFM is the number of counts per second [56]. Additionally, the
time delay between the source shutter opening and the initial detection of fission
gammas can be used to calculate the flow velocity. A complete explanation of the
BDMS and the FMFM can be found in [56 - 59].
A MATLAB Simulink model of a uranium blend-down facility was used to create
simulation data for modeling and testing. A full description of relevant equations used to
develop the Simulink model is given in Appendix A. Conventional process monitoring
methods were augmented through the development of algorithms that allow for the
addition of the FMFM signal and through data reconciliation techniques. In this
hypothetical uranium blend-down facility, uranium of two different enrichments is
blended into a product with a desired target enrichment. The facility is set up to run in a
batch mode, where tanks of high-enriched uranium-hexafluoride (HEUF6) and low
enriched uranium-hexafluoride (LEUF6) are fed through instrumented lines, blended
together, and then stored as product low-enriched uranium-hexafluoride (PLEUF6). At
standard normal atmospheric pressure and temperature, uranium-hexafluoride is
nominally a solid, but for the purpose of these simulations it was assumed gaseous.
The combination of sensors are used to monitor the process are shown in Figure 3-2.
All three legs are instrumented with flow meters and weight sensors. Additionally the
HEUF6 and PLEUF6 are instrumented with FMFMs.
The simulated measurements from the three flow meters, three weight sensors,
and two FMFMs were used to create empirical auto-associative kernel regression
(AAKR) models that encompass normal operating conditions. Velocities were varied to
simulate actual operations, but enrichment was held constant. Abnormal conditions
were simulated by allowing for the diversion of material from the HEUF6 leg just before
the blending tee. Because the removal happens after the HEUF6 leg instrumentation,
its effects should only be seen in the PLEUF6 leg instrumentation. Table 3-1
summarizes the modeled instrumentation on the hypothetical BDMS system.
43

Figure 3-2. Schematic of the simulated uranium blend-down facility. All legs are
instrumented with flow sensors and tank weight sensors. Additionally, the HEUF6 and
PLEUF6 legs are instrumented with FMFMs. Diversions were simulated by removing
material from the HEUF6 just before the blending tee.
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Table 3-1. Summary of the simulated instrumentation of the Blend Down Facility.
Sensor Number
1
2

Sensor Type
HEUF6 weight sensor (g)
LEUF6 weight sensor (g)

3

PLEUF6 weight sensor (g)

4

HEUF6 flow meter (cm/s)

5

LEUF6 flow meter (cm/s)

6

PLEUF6 flow meter (cm/s)

7

Fissile Mass Flow meter on
HEUF6 leg (gU235/sec)

8

Fissile Mass Flow meter on
PLEUF6 leg (gU235/sec)
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To simulated actual measurements, 1.0 % process noise was added to both the
HEUF6 and LEUF6 fluid velocities. Additionally, independent sensor noise was added to
each sensor. The flow meters and weight sensors had 1.0% and 0.1% respectively of
their maximum sensor reading added as Gaussian noise. Uncertainty for radiation
detectors is not quantified the same way as process sensors, but for simulation
simplicity the FMFM was assumed to have 1.0% Gaussian noise. Six scenarios were
simulated in which the magnitudes of the HEUF6 diversion were varied. In the first
scenario there was no HEUF6 diversion. The remaining five scenarios had HEUF6
diversions of 0.1%, 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, and 10% respectively.
3.1.1 Building an AAKR Model
Four different models were created. In each model, an AAKR architecture was
used. The first model used only data from the flow meters and weights sensors. The
second model used the same data as the first model, but data reconciliation techniques
were used. The third model did not use data reconciliation techniques, but the AAKR
architecture was expanded to include FMFM signals. Finally, the fourth model
incorporated both the FMFM signals and used data reconciliation. The objective of
these models was to: 1) quantify the benefits of incorporating radiation sensors into an
AAKR model and, 2) quantify the benefits of incorporating data reconciliation with the
AAKR model. The main metric will be the ability of the each model to detect a HEUF6
diversion. A summary of the different models is given in Table 3-2. A block diagram of
the models is given in Figure 3-3.
The first step to building an AAKR model is to select which measurements should
be included as inputs. These variables were selected based on their correlations.
Measurements that are highly correlated perform better as predictors. In the simulated
facility, all 8 sensors are highly correlated (correlations coefficients are all above 0.7), so
all will be included in the model. However, for a real world application with a more
complicated system, there are likely to be measurements that are not well correlated
and therefore should not be included in the model.
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Table 3-2. Summary of monitoring models for the Simulated Blend Down Facility. While
each model was based on an empirical AAKR model, there were a total of 9 different
parameters available to each model – 8 different sensors and the possibility of
preprocessing the measured signal with data reconciliation. An “X” indicates that the
sensor or technique was included in the AAKR model.
HEUF6 weight sensor
LEUF6 weight sensor
PLEUF6 weight sensor
HEUF6 flow meter
LEUF6 flow meter
PLEUF6 flow meter
HEUF6 FMFM
PLEUF6 FMFM
Data Reconciliation

Model 1
X
X
X
X
X
X

Model 2
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
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Model 3
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Model 4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Figure 3-3. Block diagram of AAKR model with data reconciliation. The data selection,
model building and predictions, and computing the residuals are the exact same as an
AAKR model without data reconciliation. The purpose of including data reconciliation is
to better constrain the measurement values using known physical laws about the
system.
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Once the relevant sensors were identified a normal dataset was generated. This
dataset should be fault free and cover the expected operating conditions. The normal
dataset serves as the historical operation data and should be large enough to cover the
extremes of normal operation. In the case of the uranium blend-down facility, the
normal set should include data representing the minimum and maximum material flow
rate as well as everything in between. If the normal data does not contain all the
expected operating conditions, then the model will perform poorly whenever the inquiry
vector is not within the bounds of the normal data. For the simulated facility, the normal
dataset was built from the data generated with no diversion.
The normal dataset was then denoised and standardized. Denoising, commonly
referred to as smoothing, attempts to remove the uncorrelated and independent
measurement noise inherent in all instrumentation as well as noise spikes resulting from
outside processes (such as a vibration spike due to somebody hitting a pipe). In the
simulated facility each measurement was contaminated with 1% gaussian noise. The
data was denoised with a median filter with a window of 5. Standardizing the data is the
process of mean-centering the data and scaling the data so that it has a unit-variance.
To mean center the data, the mean value for each sensor in the normal dataset is
simply subtracted. To give the data a unit variance, each value is divided by the
variance of the normal dataset. The denoising and standardizing, or scaling,
parameters used to mean center and unit variance the normal data set are applied to
each subsequent dataset. This means that all subsequent datasets were: denoised
with a median filter with a window of 5, had the mean of the normal dataset subtracted
for each sensor, and had each sensor divided by the variance of the normal dataset.
Next a test and validation dataset were generated. These datasets were
denoised and scaled in the same way the normal dataset is. The test dataset is used to
optimize the AAKR model and the validation dataset is used to determine the model’s
performance. These datasets do not have to cover every operating condition as the
normal dataset did, but should cover a sample of each. Each dataset should be
independent, for example the testing and validation dataset should not be the exact
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same data. These datasets were also generated from the simulated scenario with no
diversion.
When an inquiry vector is processed, the vectors in the normal dataset are
selected based on their similarity to the inquiry vector. The similarity is determined by
calculating the Euclidean distance between the two vectors, and the weights are
calculated using a Gaussian Kernel. Initially, the kernel bandwidth is set to 1, but was
then optimized using the test dataset. The bandwidth was optimized so that the model
uncertainty is minimized. Once the similar vectors have been selected, the prediction is
calculated by taking a weighted sum of the similar vectors. The effects of bandwidth
optimization are shown in Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4.
Once the kernel has been optimized using the test dataset, the validation dataset
was used to quantify the performance metrics of a model. The validation dataset was
denoised and scaled the same way as the normal dataset. The bandwidth for the
Gaussian kernel was previously optimized with the testing dataset. The Euclidean
distances and observation weights are determined, and a prediction is made using the
weighted sum of the similar vectors. Once a prediction is made, the residual was
calculated by finding the difference between the prediction and actual measurement.
Model performance characteristics such as accuracy, uncertainty, cross sensitivity, auto
sensitivity, error-uncertainty limit monitoring (EULM) detectability, and SPRT
detectability were calculated using this dataset. A complete description of these metrics
can be found in [60-62].
Once the AAKR model was optimized and its performance metrics characterized,
data from the other 5 scenarios (the diversions) were fed through the model and the
residuals were analyzed using the SPRT. A fault was declared when detected using the
SPRT alarm. The SPRT alarm requires four pieces of information: the mean of the
expected residuals, the variance of the expected residuals, a false alarm probability,
and a missed alarm probability. The expected mean and variance of the residuals was
captured when quantifying the performance metrics. The false alarm and missed alarm
probability were set to 1% and 10% respectively. To compensate for the high false
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alarm and missed alarm probability, several consecutive residuals were required to be
detected using the SPRT alarm before the fault was considered detected. So while the
probability of a single residual being incorrectly detected using the SPRT alarm may be
high, the probability of several consecutive residuals being incorrectly detected is much
lower. Therefore, the specified false alarm and missed alarm probabilities are not truly
representative of the actual false alarm and missed alarm probabilities. 5 consecutive
residuals had to be detected before the fault was considered identified. In applications
where there are not a large number of predictions, and therefore not a large number of
residuals, the false alarm and missed alarm rates should be lowered.

3.2

Load Cell Monitoring at a Mock Feed and Withdrawal Facility
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) mock feed and withdrawal facility is

designed to mimic large plant feed and withdrawal facilities. A schematic of the facility
is shown in Figure 3-4.
In this facility, water is pumped from a feed tank into a surge tank, which then
drains by gravity into a product tank and a tail tank. The only instrumentation is the
weight sensors that monitor the feed, product, and tail tanks. Initially, the height of
water in the surge tank was maintained via manually adjusting valves on the surge
outlet. This control setup led to inconsistent operation depending on the attentiveness
of the operator. A control valve and pressure sensor was later installed to replace
operator (described in section 4.2.3). Throttling valves are used to fine tune the ratio of
product to tail flow. This setup is analogous to a batch operation where tanks are
placed on a scale and material is processed ,resulting in product and tail material. The
actual facility (shown in Figure 3-5) has three feed, three product, and two tail tanks to
allow for continuous operation.
For example, in a gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant, a tank of feed material
would be weighed and fed though a cascade of centrifuges, resulting in product
(enriched) material and tail (depleted) material. The weight of the tank would be
monitored by a load cell station, which includes a weight scale. The surge tank serves
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Figure 3-4. Schematic of the ORNL mock feed and withdrawal facility. Tanks of water
are placed on the feed station and the water is pumped into a surge tank. Water is then
partially routed to a tail and production station. In this setup, the pump, surge tank, and
stream splitter serve as a mock cascade area.
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Figure 3-5. The actual ORNL mock feed and withdrawal facility. Three feed stations are
pumped into a Surge tank, which then drains into the product and tail stations. Before
and after a tank is processed at each station, it is weighed on an accountability scale.
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as a black-box between the feed, product, and tail material. The inventory difference is
defined as the material unaccounted for between the beginning and end of the process.
In a gaseous centrifuge plant, the surge tank would be analogous to material in the
centrifuge cascade, including material that leaks or plates out on piping.
As tanks are brought into the facility, they are weighed on an accountability scale and
are then stored. When a tank is ready to be processed it is placed on the appropriate
station process scale, the material is processed, and it is removed. A tank is then reweighed on the accountability scale. The total amount of material processed is
calculated from weight recorded by the accountability scales, and it is recorded on a
material declaration sheet. In an actual GCEP, the accountability scales require more
precision and calibration than the process scales since they are used to declare the
amount of material. During an inspection, the IAEA will check thecalibration of the
accountancy scales and check the weight of a sample of cylinders. A schematic of a
tank life cycle and the types of data generated during operation is shown in Figure 3-6.
In the ORNL facility, the accountability scale data is a step function that represents the
weight of a tank placed on the accountability scale. The process scale data is a
continuous function that shows the instantaneous weight of a cylinder as material is
being processed. Process scale data is collected from the weight scales at each of the
feed, tail, and product stations. The accountability scale data and process scale data at
a large GCEP is directly analogous the accountability scale data and process scale data
at the ORNL mock feed and withdrawal facility. The facility control data is the data used
to control the flow of material inside the mock cascade area. In the ORNL mock feed
and withdrawal facility, this data is limited to the signals from the feed pump current, the
control valve and pressure transducer. In as actual GCEP the facility control data would
encompass all of the controls in a cascade area including: control valves between
centrifuges; motor signatures for each centrifuge; flow, pressure, and temperature
measurements within each centrifuge; etc. A sample of the different data types is
shown below in Figure 3-7. The accountability scale data is used to make mock
operator declaration sheets. The current inspection process only uses data from the
accountability scales. A sample declaration sheet is shown in Table 3-3.
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Figure 3-6. The life cycle of a tank at the ORNL mock feed and withdrawal facility and
the type of data generated during each stage of the tank life cycle. The black boxes
and arrows represent how the physical material is moved through the facility. The blue
boxes and dashed arrows represent the data collected from each physical location.

55

Figure 3-7. A sample of the different data types collected at the ORNL mock feed and
withdrawal facility. The accountancy scale data (a) is a step function of a tank’s weight
before and after processing. The process scale data (b) is continuous and shows the
instantaneous weight of a tank on a station as material is being processed. The feed
pump power (c) data is a type of facility control data and may either be a step function
or continuous depending upon the instrumentation.
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Table 3-3. A material declaration sheet from the ORNL mock feed and withdrawal
facility. The sheet list the initial and final tank weight, as read by the accountability
scales, before and after processing.
Tank ID
25G04
25G06
25G05
10L02
10L03

Initial
Weight (kg)
85.09
141.44
35.32
1.148
1.152

Date

Time

14-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10

3:30 PM
10:15 AM
10:15 AM
10:15 AM
10:15 AM
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Final
Weight (kg)
35.22
35.56
141.01
10.399
1.148

Date

Time

15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10

11:05 AM
12:05 PM
12:05 PM
1:05 PM
1:05 PM

To find undeclared activity, the inspector would first confirm the calibration of the
accountancy scales and then reweigh a sample of tanks and compare them to the
declaration sheets. In a large facility, the sheer amount of material processed limits the
ability of an inspector to efficiently search for undeclared activity. However, an
automated system that tracks the tank weights as seen by the process scale would
provide a measure of cross-validation to the declaration sheets. Additionally,
implementing process monitoring techniques that are sensitive to subtle process
changes would increase an inspector's sensitivity to undeclared activity and possible
special nuclear material diversions.
At the ORNL facility, sensors are sampled at 1 hertz and stored in a computer
database. A MATLAB graphical user interface (GUI) was developed to read the
database output and generate a report mimicking a declaration sheet by:
1 Identifying the state of each station (Empty, Static, Filling, or Draining)
based on the profile of the process scale data. The process scale data
shows the instantaneous tank weight as material is being processed,
rather than just the initial and final weight, and has significant features that
give insight into the state of each station. The station states were the
foundation in building a load cell monitoring system.

2 Providing a declaration sheet based on the weights read by the process
scales via a cylinder counting algorithm. The counting algorithm extracted
how many tanks were placed and removed from each process station and
the initial and final weight of each tank. The GUI declaration sheet is
similar in form to the facility declaration sheet and provided an efficient
way to ensure that the facility declared all processing activities.

3 Tracking the cumulative inventory difference of the facility identifying
atypical process operations that could be indicative of material diversion or
other abnormal activity.
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The state specific models mentioned in item 3 would be based on a process
monitoring scheme similar to the one described for the BDMS. Initially the model would
only use data from the process scales. However, the effects of adding other facility data
into the model will also be described. A MATLAB Simulink model of the facility was also
developed for the ORNL facility to evaluate the effect of additional sensors not originally
present in the actual facility. The relevant facility equations for the Simulink model are
listed in Appendix B.
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4

APPLICATIONS AND RESULTS
This section presents the results of the Uranium Blend-Down Facility simulation

and the development of a load cell monitoring system for the ORNL mock feed and
withdrawal facility. First, the effects of incorporating radiation detector signals and
combining data reconciliation with the AAKR model are investigated with simulated data
from the Uranium blend-down facility. Second, the development of a load cell
monitoring system for the ORNL facility is described.

4.1

The Uranium Blend-Down Facility Simulation
A MATLAB Simulink model was developed to simulate data from the Blend-Down

Monitoring System. The model was used to simulate both normal plant operations and
anomalous operations resulting from a diversion from the HEUF6 leg. The simulated
data was used to develop an AAKR model to monitor the blend-down process. The
AAKR model requires correlated sensors to make accurate predictions. However, the
instantaneous tank weight is not well correlated. Therefore, the derivative of the weight
sensors was approximated by the difference between two consecutive observations to
determine the instantaneous rate of change in weight, also referred to as the mass flow
rate. The equation relating mass flow rate and gas velocity is:
(4.1)
where

is the mass flow rate in g/sec,

is the gas density in g/cm3,

cross sectional area of the pipe in cm2, and

is the

is the gas velocity in cm/sec. The gas

density is assumed to be constant during operation, so the mass flow rate and gas flow
rate are directly proportional to each other. Additionally, the FMFM is modeled as
linearly proportional to the mass flow. The linear approximation is valid for this system
since the k-effective of the gas stream is low (<.1) and therefore the subcritical
multiplication of the system is also low. Therefore, all measurements essentially give
the same information. But, because the data comes from independent sensors they
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provide a level of redundancy. Figure 4-1 shows typical data generated by the Simulink
model. While only data for the LEU leg is shown, each leg is instrumented identically.
Even though the instantaneous weight sensors are not well suited for the AAKR
method, they still provide useful information. A bleed-off or diversion scenario will
eventually be detected by tracking the tank weight residual, i.e., the initial total weight of
the HEUF6 and LEUF6 less the current sum of the three weight measurements. This
residual will steadily increase as more HEUF6 is diverted.
The AAKR model is able to predict the 1% process noise because it is common
in each sensor. However the independent measurement noise cannot be predicted
because it is not correlated within the sensors. The accuracy is less than 1% because
the model tends to average the sensor noise through the inherent redundancy in the
physical arrangement.
Four different models were considered and were described in section 3.1. All
four models have similar performance on the unfaulted data. The unfaulted data
performance describes the ability of the model to predict, or confirm, the measured
sensor values. Table 4-1 summarizes the average accuracy expressed as percent error
and average uncertainty, expressed as a percent of the mean sensor value, for each of
the four AAKR models built from unfaulted data. For each model, a diversion was
declared detected when the SPRT alarm indicated a change in the residuals.
Neither model 1 nor model 2 incorporated the FMFM's and therefore relied only on the
derivative of the instantaneous tank weight and gas flow velocities to build a model and
detect a fault. Any diversion from the HEUF6 would be seen as a change in the
residuals between the measured and predicted values in any of the PLEUF 6 sensors,
shown in Figure 4-2. While neither model 1 nor model 2 was able to detect the 10%
diversion instantaneously, the diversion could still have been detected by tracking all
three tanks weights (the HEUF6 tank, the LEUF6 tank, and the PLEUF6 tank) and
ensuring that total outflow from the HEUF6 and LEUF6 tank equal the inflow to the
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Figure 4-1. Simulated data from the Uranium blend-down facility Simulink model. The
simulated data represents unfaulted operation. Initially, the LEU process scale is
vacant, then a tank is added and its material processed, and finally the tank is removed.
The LEU Flow and FMFM show a step change corresponding to when a tank begins
processing. The LEU mass flow is not a direct output of the model but is approximated
by taking the derivative of the LEU tank weight.
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Table 4-1. Summary of AAKR model performance for unfaulted data from the blenddown monitoring system simulation. The accuracy is expressed in terms of percent
error, so a lower value is indicative of less error. The uncertainty is expressed as a
percent of the mean sensor value.
Accuracy (%)
Uncertainty (%)

Model 1
0.45
1.58

Model 2
0.27
1.94
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Model 3
0.58
2.12

Model 4
0.43
1.73

.
Figure 4-2. Residuals and SPRT Alarm for the P-LEU velocity sensor (model 2) 10%
diversion scenario. Because there is no statistical change between the predicted and
measured values, a 10% diversion could not be detected with this model. Note that in
the top graph the residuals show no change and the SPRT does not alarm.
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PLEUF6 tank. The cumulative weight difference between the three tanks is shown in
Figure 4-3. Under normal conditions, the residual should fluctuate around zero because
the mass flow rate out of a tank is balanced with the mass flow rate into another tank.
Under a diversion, there is a growing residual proportional to the cumulative amount of
material diverted. This diversion assumes that the diverter does not introduce foreign
material into the PLEUF6 tank at the same rate that he diverts from the HEUF6 leg.
Doing so would ensure the mass flow rate into and out of the tanks remains equal,
meaning that the residuals would show no indication that a diversion was taking place.
Models 3 and 4 incorporated the FMFMs and therefore had a sensor that was
very sensitive to only the 235U flow (instead of the total Uranium flow). The total mass
flow rate from the LEUF6 leg is approximately 32x larger than the mass flow rate from
the HEUF6, so the PLEUF6 leg mass flow rate is dominated by the LEUF6 leg flow.
Therefore, diversions from the HEUF6 leg have a minimal impact on the PLEUF6 tank
weight and flow measurements. However, when examining the 235U flow instead of the
total Uranium flow, the HEUF6 is much more significant since the flow enrichment is
90%, while the LEUF6 leg enrichment is less than 1%. Therefore, diversions from the
HEUF6 leg have a significant impact on the total 235U flow seen by the PLEUF6 FMFM.
Figure 4-4 shows the measured and predicted values for the PLEUF6 FMFM in the 10%
diversion scenario. The diversion can immediately be identified by the step change in
the residuals.
Comparing the residuals, Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-4 shows that with the 6 sensor
model (models 1 and 2), a 10% diversion could not be detected, but the 8 sensor model
(model 3 and 4) could detect the diversion. The next step was to determine the minimal
diversion that could be detected with the 8 sensor model. The Sequential Probability
Ratio Test (SPRT) is a statistical technique developed to detect subtle changes in
process parameters [60]. The SPRT essentially measures if a sequence of numbers
comes from a specified distribution of not. If the model were perfect, then the residuals
would only reflect the measurement noise of each sensor. Since the measurement
noise of each sensor comes from a Gaussian distribution, the residuals should also be
normally distributed. During normal operation, the distribution of the residuals will
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Figure 4-3. Cumulative weight difference between the three tanks during a diversion.
Under normal operation, the cumulative weight difference should be zero, since
everything that leaves the HEUF6 and LEUF6 tanks enter the PLEUF6 tank. During a
10% diversion, there is a growing residual as the cumulative amount of material diverted
increases.
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Figure 4-4. Predicted and measured PLEUF6 flow rates for the 10% diversion scenario
for the 8 sensor model (models 3 and 4). In the top plot the measured values are in
blue and the prediction values are in red. There is a large statistical change between
the predicted and measured values. A 10% diversion could be detected with this
model. Note that in the top graph, the predicted values are indistinguishable from the
measured values before the diversion takes place.
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remain normal and the residuals will pass the SPRT test. The SPRT assumes the
residuals come are gaussian white noise. In reality the residuals do not always meet
those assumptions. When the assumptions are not fully met the SPRT will have a
higher false alarm rate. However, by initially specifying a high false alarm rate and
requiring several consecutive residuals to fail before declared a fault identified, the true
false alarm rate is much lower. For instance in Figure 4-2 there are no alarmed states,
even though with over 7000 data points and a specified false alarm rate of 1% one
would expected about 70 false alarms. While requiring consecutive residuals to fail
reduces to true false alarm rate, it tends to lengthen the time to detect a fault. But, this
is a small effect in detecting a diversion, only requiring the alarm to occur a few time
steps after the diversion starts. During a diversion the distribution of residuals will
change and if the change is large enough then the residuals will fail the SPRT test.
For the 8 sensor model, the SPRT detectability was found to be 1.10%. Therefore the
model can detect a 2.0% diversion, but it cannot consistently detect the 1.0%, 0.5%, or
0.1% diversion. Figure 4-5 shows the measured and predicted values for the PLEUF6
FMFM in the 2.0% diversion scenario. A missed alarm would be seen as an unalarmed state in Figure 4-5 after the 200th time step, which is when the diversion is
started. With a specified missed alarm rate of 10% and about 1000 residuals in the
faulted state, the expected number of missed alarms would have been around 100.
However, requiring consecutive residuals to fail the also lowers the true missed alarm
rate just as it did for the false alarm rage. Figure 4-5 shows now unalarmed states
between 200 and 1200, so the true missed alarm rate is much lower than 10%.
The models that incorporated data reconciliation had similar accuracy and
uncertainty measurements as well as fault detection characteristics. The improvements
caused by data reconciliation are not visible by simply inspecting the residual plots.
Table 4-2 summarizes some additional performance metrics. With each metric a lower
value is desired. The accuracy is expressed in terms of percent error, so a lower value
indicates less error. The analytical uncertainty is also expressed as a percent, with a
lower uncertainty corresponding to a higher precision. Auto-sensitivity is a measure of
robustness, with a lower value indicated a higher robustness. The auto-sensitivity
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Figure 4-5. Predicted and measured PLEUF6 flow rates for the 2% diversion scenario
for the 8 sensor model (models 3 and 4). In the top plot, the measured values are in
blue and the prediction values are in red. The SPRT identifies statistical change in the
residuals, indicating that a 2% diversion could be detected with this model.
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measures how much a faulted sensor input affects the prediction of the same sensor.
The cross-sensitivity is a measures the spillover effect. The spillover effect is the effect
a faulted sensor input has to the prediction of a different sensor. The Error Uncertainty
Limit Monitoring (EULM) detectability indicates the smallest fault that is detector using
Error Uncertainty Limit Monitoring, which monitors the uncertainty of the prediction
errors relative to some specified tolerance. The EULM metric defines how small of a
drift can be detected with 95% certainty. Finally, the SPRT Detectability measures the
smallest process parameter change that can be detected using the Sequential
Probability Ratio Test. A more complete explanation of these metrics can be found in
[60-62]. While most of the metrics are very similar between model 3 and model 4, the
EULM detectability and SPRT detectability were significantly improved by the
application of data reconciliation to model 4. Each metric is about 30% smaller in model
4, meaning that the model’s fault detection capability is about 30% better. It is important
to note that these models were created using simulated data and in a highly idealized
case. In a real world application, the signals may not be as clean and the correlations
between sensors would not be as high. However, the basic relationships between the
sensors would not change. The effect of real data would degrade each metric in Table
4-2 and decrease overall model performance. However, the effects would be seen in
each of the 4 models. While the performance metrics listed in Table 4-2 are better than
would be expected in an actual model, they are still useful for comparing how each
model would perform in comparison to the other models.

4.2

The ORNL Mock Feed and Withdrawal Facility
The previous section showed an application of process monitoring for safeguards

on a simulated facility with simulated data. The ORNL Mock Feed and Withdrawal
facility provides a more realistic test bed for the development and application of a
safeguards monitoring system. Whereas with the simulated uranium blend-down facility
detecting material diversion was the sole safeguards option, with the ORNL facility the
safeguards goal is to detect undeclared activity and to alert an inspector to atypical
facility operation – not necessarily limited to material diversions.
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Table 4-2. Model performance metrics for model 3 (No Data Reconciliation) and Model
4 (With Data Reconciliation). With each metric, a lower value is desired. The accuracy
is expressed in terms of percent error, so a lower value is indicative of less error.
Model 3
(No Data Reconciliation)

Model 4
(With Data Reconciliation)

Accuracy (percent)

0.58

0.43

Uncertainty (percent)

2.12

1.73

Auto-sensitivity

0.65

0.53

Cross-sensitivity

0.15

0.13

EULM Detectability

6.07

4.30

SPRT Detectability

1.58

1.09
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The ORNL facility has limited instrumentation. Initially, the only data available
came from the process load cell stations. Using load cell data, an automated method
for reconciling process scale data and accountability scale data to ensure that no
undeclared material processing has taken place was developed similar to the template
matching procedure outlined in [49]. In a real GCEP, undeclared production may
indicate that the facility is stockpiling special nuclear material for possible clandestine
purposes. The developed algorithms determine if the amount of material processed
according to the accountancy scale data matches the amount of material processed
according to the process scale data (Figure 4-6). Additionally, the cumulative inventory
difference (CID) was analyzed to determine if any material diversion took place during
operation.
Initially, the stream splitter shown in Figure 3-4 consisted of three hand valves: a
master on/off valve and two small throttling valves. Maintaining a steady surge tank
level required an operator to constantly adjust the throttling valves. In practice, it is
difficult to precisely control the manuals valves to keep the surge tank constant while
routing the proper amount of flow to the tail and product legs. This type of control
scheme led to large inconsistencies in the instantaneous inventory difference and the
material inflow and outflow of the surge tank. A picture of the original control scheme is
provided in Figure 4-7. A typical feed, product, and tail process scale profile from this
control scheme is shown in Figure 4-8. Figure 4-8 shows several problems arising from
the manual control scheme originally employed. Most notably, material is drained into
the tail tank for an additional 50 minutes after the feed tank has been emptied. The two
blue circles in Figure 4-8 represent changes to the tail tank flow, but they do not
correspond to changes to either the feed flow or product flow. The manual control
scheme led to a highly variable system where the relationship between the inflow and
outflow did not remain stable. At an actual GCEP, the material flow into and out of the
cascade area are tightly controlled, and the amount of holdup material in the facility low.
In the ORNL facility, the surge tank provides an unrealistically large hold-up volume
when compared to a GCEP. However, the larger holdup volume is required because
the pressure of the water column in the surge tank is the driving force of the material
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Figure 4-6. An essential function of the MATLAB GUI is to determine if the amount of
material processed according to the accountancy scale data (and listed in the
declaration sheet) agrees with the amount of material processed according to the
process scale data.
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Figure 4-7. Original Facility control setup. The yellow-handled valve behind the
throttling valves acted as a master on/off valve for the surge tank. During operation, the
master valve was opened and the two throttling valves were used to route the proper
amount of material to the product and tail legs. Proper operation required that the
operator be aware of the surge tank level and the ratio of material routed to the product
and tail legs. In practice, balancing material flow into and out of the surge tank while
simultaneously routing the proper amount of material to each leg was difficult to
achieve by simply adjusting the throttling valves. The control system was very sensitive
to operator attentiveness and to changes in operator personnel.
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Figure 4-8. Facility data from March 27, 2009 when the facility was still under manual
control. The black line at 125 minutes represents when operation should have finished.
There is no more feed material entering the mock cascade area, and the product tank is
completely filled. However, because the operator was unable to balance the material
flow within the surge tank, approximately 30 kg of water accumulated in the surge tank
which than had to be drained into a tail tank. Additionally the blue circles highlight times
when the tail tank flows were adjusted, but without any corresponding adjustments to
the feed or tail flow. This control scheme led to high variability in the system, where
inflow to the mock cascade area was no longer an accurate predictor of outflow of the
mock cascade area.
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outflow. In an actually GCEP, pumps move the material into and out of the cascade
area.
4.2.1 Types of Operation at the ORNL Facility
The ORNL facility’s purpose is to provide test data for on-line monitoring
techniques. Three different types of runs were performed to provide case studies for
the load cell monitoring system: normal operation, undeclared activity, and product leg
diversions. During normal operation, tanks are weighed on an accountability scale,
placed on the appropriate process station, and material is processed. When processing
is complete, the tanks removed from the process scales are re-weighed on the
accountability scales. The weights from the accountability scales are recorded on the
material declaration sheet. The material declaration sheet is the official record of what
was processed, and the accountability scales are considered authenticated scales that
would be used during an inspection. Data from the process scales are stored in a
central database. The process scales are not authenticated, and the data from the
process scales are used by the facility for process monitoring. The process scales
would not be used by an inspector because they are not authenticated.
Most of the runs performed were normal operation. The feed rates and stations
used varied in each run to create a realistic operational history. The data from normal
operation was used to develop and train the monitoring system. The undeclared activity
runs were essentially the same as the normal operation runs, except the tanks were not
weighed on the accountability scales and therefore do not appear on the material
declaration sheet. This scenario was meant to represent a facility trying to hide its
material throughput from an inspector, for the purpose of obtaining product material.
While the ORNL facility only processes water, at a GCEP the product material would be
HEUF6, possibly for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons. In practice, normal
operation runs doubled as undeclared activity runs by simply ignoring the material
declaration sheet. The life cycle of a tank during an undeclared activity run is shown in
Figure 4-9. Comparing a material declaration sheet to a process scale declaration
sheet can identify undeclared activity. For undeclared activity, it was usually assumed
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Figure 4-9. The life cycle of a tank during undeclared activity. This scenario looks like
normal operation except no authenticated accountability data is generated. This
scenario represents a facility processing undeclared material in an attempt to make
HEUF6 for their own, possible clandestine, purpose.
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that a feed, tail, and product tank was not declared. However, any combination or
number of the tanks could have been undeclared.
The third type of run was a product leg diversion. In this scenario some material
was diverted from the product leg. There were two different diversion scenarios. In the
first scenario no make-up material was added to the tanks to mask the diversion. In the
second scenario make-up material was introduced. The ORNL facility has a small
diversion leg installed on the product leg, as shown in Figure 4-10. In a diversion
scenario the material declaration sheet will match the process scale declaration sheet,
but looking at the CID of the facility will show a non-stable value as more and more
material is diverted.
The final scenario was a masked enrichment operation. In this scenario an
undeclared feed, tail, and product tank were processed in parallel with a declared feed,
tail, and product tank. However, the undeclared tanks were not placed on a process
scale, so there was no process scale data either. This scenario was the limiting case
study. The CID shows some hint of atypical facility operation, but was not able to
definitively identify that undeclared material was processed off-scale. Figure 4-11
describes the masked enrichment scenario.
4.2.2 Development of a Load Cell Monitoring System
While the relationships between the flows were highly variable, the general
profile from each station follows a predictable pattern. When a station is empty the
station weight readout fluctuates around zero. Then a tank is placed on the station
resulting in a step change followed by a brief period of high variability as the weight
settles. As material is processed then weight of a tank either increases or decreased
until the tank is full/empty, and then a tank is removed. There is another brief period of
high variability as the tank. Figure 4-12 shows the raw profile for a feed, tail, and
product station. The raw profile is noise free except for the spikes when a tank is first
loaded or unloaded from a station. Part c of Figure 4-12 shows data from all the
process scales during operation. The first requirement of the load cell monitoring
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Figure 4-10. Diversion path at the ORNL facility.
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Figure 4-11. Description of an enrichment masking scenario at the ORNL facility.
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Figure 4-12. Raw tank station profiles. (a) shows the profile from a Feed Station, while
(b) shows the profile from a tail and product station. Both (a) and (b) show the large
spikes when a tank is added or removed (circled in red). In (b) the product station
(blue) spikes are not as significant because the product tanks are much smaller. (c)
Shows the profiles from all 8 stations (3 feed, 3 product, and 2 tail) at the ORNL facility.
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system was to take the data from Part c of Figure 4-12 and automatically generate a
summary sheet for comparison to the material declaration sheet.
To calculate the number of cylinders and the amount of material processed at
each station, a method similar to the template matching procedure outlined in [49] was
employed. Rather than trying to match each profile to a specific template, the state of
each process scale was generally categorized as Empty, Static, Filling, or Draining.
States were identified by looking at the magnitude of the weight, and the derivative of
the weight reading, approximating the mass flow rate. Because identifying the state
required approximating derivatives, the large spikes associated with the loading and
unloading of tanks were first removed or the derivative at those times would not have
been meaningful.
While the process scale data was sampled at 1Hz, it was downsampled to 0.2 Hz
during analysis. Downsampling was done to limit the amount of memory required
process a run. For instance, a month of process scale data contained over 25 million
data points. Usually only a single day’s worth of data was analyzed at a time because
operating procedures are ORNL did not allow the facility to run over night.
Downsampling the data reduced the amount of data exported from the facility while still
preserving all the transients associated with operation of the facility.
A median filter was used to remove the noise spikes. A median filter uses a
window of values about a point, finds the median value within the window, and assigns
the value to the original point. A median filter is useful for removing spikes without
changing the original trend or mean of the data. For the ORNL facility a window size of
11 consecutive points was used. Since the data was first downsampled to 0.2 Hz, a
window size of 11 actually corresponds to a window of 55 seconds. Figure 4-13 shows
the smoothing effect of a median filter on a feed tank profile.
Once the noise spikes have been removed, the state of an individual station is
categorized in a two step process. The first step determines when the scale is empty by
looking for a weight reading of below 0.5 kg. 0.5 kg is above the noise level of an empty
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Figure 4-13. The effect of using a median filter on a feed scale profile. The raw data
shown in blue is noise free except for spikes when a tank is unloaded and loaded – at
approximately 600 and 650 minutes respectively. The dotted red line shows the
smoothed data. It follows the same profile are the raw data, only without the noise
spikes.
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scale, but still well below the weight of a scale occupied with an empty tank. There is
no mass flow rate threshold to identify an Empty state. The other three states, Static,
Draining, and Filling, do have mass flow rate thresholds. Static is used to identify the
times when a scale is occupied but material from that specific station is not being
processed, and Draining and Filling are used to identify when material is actually being
processed at the station. The mass flow rate limits for a Static state are set to +/- 0.2
kg/sec for feed and tail tanks and +/- 0.02 kg/sec for product tanks. Product tanks have
a smaller window because they are about 1/10th the size of a feed and tail tank and
because the product station scales have less noise. The mass flow rate limits for the
Draining and Filling state are -3 to -0.2 kg/sec and 0.2 to 3.0 kg/sec for feed and tail
tanks and -0.3 to -0.02 kg/sec and 0.02 to 0.3 kg/sec for product tanks respectively.
The derivative thresholds were chosen based on known properties of the system. For
instance, the maximum feed rate is limited by the pumps at 2.0 kg/min, while normal
operation is 1.5 kg/min. A summary of the state identification parameters is given in
Table 4-3. Figure 4-14 graphically shows a raw tank profile and its approximated mass
flow rate, and it shows the application of each threshold for a feed tank profile. Figure
4-15 shows the raw data from a feed station in the top plot and the results of smoothing
and categorizing the station state in the bottom plot. In the bottom plot of Figure 4-15,
the spikes associated with the loading and unloading of the tank have been smoothed,
and the times when the station is Empty, Static, and Draining have been properly
identified by looking at the derivative and absolute value of the raw data.
Once the states of an individual process station have been identified, the life
cycle of a tank can be viewed with respect to possible station states. Figure 4-16
outlines the possible state transitions for the process stations. A station started in either
the Empty state or the Static state, depending on whether or not a tank was already on
the scale. If initially empty, once a tank was placed on the appropriate station, the state
changed to the Static state. As material was processed, the station transitioned to
either a Draining or Filling state depending, depending on whether the tank was
receiving material or was having material removed. Once processing was complete, the
station returned to the Static state. If the tank was removed, the station state returned
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Table 4-3. Summary of thresholds for identifying station states.
State
Empty (Feed or Tail)
Static (Feed or Tail)
Draining (Feed or Tail)
Filling (Feed or Tail)
Empty (Product)
Static (Product)
Draining (Product)
Filling (Product)

Magnitude
Threshold
< 0.5 kg
> 0.5 kg
> 0.5 kg
> 0.5 kg
< 0.5 kg
> 0.5 kg
> 0.5 kg
> 0.5 kg

Derivative Threshold
(Lower)
N/A
-0.2 kg/sec
-3.0 kg/sec
0.2 kg/sec
N/A
-0.02 kg/sec
-.30 kg/sec
0.02 kg/sec
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Derivative Threshold
(Upper)
N/A
0.2 kg/sec
-0.2 kg/sec
3.0 kg/sec
N/A
0.02 kg/sec
-0.02 kg/sec
.30 kg/sec

Figure 4-14. A feed station profile and its approximated mass flow rates. The top plot
shows a feed station profile with the 0.5 kg limit plotted as a dotted line. When the
weight reading is below the dotted line, the station is said to be in the Empty state. The
bottom plot shows the approximated mass flow rate for the same profile. The
thresholds for the Static, Filling, and Draining state are shown as dotted lines. In
addition to the mass flow rate falling within the specified region, the magnitude of the
weight must be above 0.5.
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Figure 4-15. The top plot shows the raw data from a feed station. The bottom plot
shows the same station only the data has been filtered and the states identified. The
profile portions are correctly identified as Empty, Static, or Draining based on the
derivative and the absolute value of the data.
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Figure 4-16. The life cycle of a process station with respect to 4 possible states.
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to Empty. Alternatively, if the tank was not completely empty of full, more material was
processed and the station state would have returned to either Draining or Filling. This
cycle repeated itself as more tanks were added or removed. To count the number of
cylinders processed, one looked for when a station first enters an Empty state and then
when the station returned to an Empty state. If between those two states material was
processed, then increment the number of cylinders processed. Special cases were
needed if station did not start in the Empty state (which happened if a tank was already
on the station at the beginning of the analysis) and if the station did not end in the
Empty state (which happened if the tank was not removed by the end of the analysis).
To calculate the amount of material processed, the difference between the
beginning and ending weight values of each Filling or Draining state was calculated and
summed together for each tank. By only looking at the Filling or Draining states instead
of the weight before and after the tank is placed on the station, the influence of
unfiltered noise spikes was minimized. Since the data was time tagged, more
information was available than from the declaration report. Figure 4-17 shows an
accountancy scale profile overlapped with a process scale profile. The declaration
report is generated from authenticated process scale data, while the process summary
report comes from unauthenticated process scales. The information in the process
summary report can then be used to validate the declaration report to provide an
inspector with greater assurance that all the material processed by the facility is
properly declared for in the declaration report. The process summary report contains
more information than the declaration report, but information barriers could be used to
limit the output or change the format to exactly mimic a declaration report.
Once a process summary report has been generated, the final step is to compare
it to a material declaration sheet to search for undeclared activity. Undeclared activity
means that a tank is not weighed on the accountancy scales and recorded in the
declaration report, but is still processed at the facility. Therefore the amount of cylinders
recorded by a material declaration sheet and indicated by the process summary report
would differ. However, a direct comparison between the material declaration sheet and
the process summary sheet is hindered by two facts: tanks ID numbers are recorded
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Figure 4-17. A sample accountancy scale profile and process scale profile. The dark
blue bars represent data from the accountancy scales. These values are step functions
that represent the authenticated tank weights. The accountancy scale values are then
used to generate the declaration report. The light blue line represents a station profile
as recorded by the process scales. This information is used to generate a process
summary report which can be compared directly to the declaration report, providing the
inspector with more assurance that all the material processed by the facility was
recorded in the declaration report.
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on the material declaration sheet, but are not available with the process scale data, and
the process scales may not be as calibrated or precise as the accountability scales. In
an actual facility, the difference between an accountability scale reading and a process
scale reading may be as much as 30 kg. However, this difference usually represents a
near constant offset. Since matching based on tank ID’s is not available (because the
tank ID is not included in the process scale data) and matching based on the initial
and/or final weights may not be practical (due to the difference in scale calibration and
precision), the next best method was to try and match tanks paced on the delta between
the initial and final tank weights. The comparison algorithms calculates the delta for
each tank declared on the material declaration sheet and for each tank listed in the
process summary report, and matches them most similar deltas. A report is then
generated listing each matched and unmatched tank. Unmatched tanks from the
process summary report would be indicative of undeclared activity. A sample case is
shown in section 4.2.4.
4.2.3 Addition of a PI Controller
Because of the variability introduced with the manual control scheme, a rulebased monitoring system was necessary. A rule-based system monitoring system is a
system where one identifies a set of rules specific to a facility. These rules require a
thorough understanding of the facility and its operation, therefore a system developed
for one facility is generally not applicable to another. For the load cell monitoring
system, a set of rules were developed to identify the station states and to count the
number of cylinders processed. While a rule-based system was sufficient for cylinder
counting and verifying the material declaration sheet, it provided a poor foundation for
identifying atypical activity. The MATLAB Simulink model of the facility was used to
scope what improvements could be made if a different control scheme was employed.
Removing the human element from the control scheme would remove most of the
variability in the system, which in turn would make facility operation more consistent.
The most intuitive method was to replace the manual control valves with an automated
PI controller. Figure 4-18 shows the simulated data when a PI controller is employed
rather than manual control. Comparing Figure 4-18 to actual facility data generated with
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Figure 4-18. Simulated data from incorporating a PI controller instead of a manual
control scheme. In the simulated data, the PI controller keeps a constant level in the
surge tank, so the mass flow into and out of the surge tank are kept equal. When the
mass flow into and out of the surge tank is equal, the correlations between each
individual flow rate increase, and more sensitive monitoring techniques can be
employed to search for atypical facility operation.
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the manual control scheme shown in Figure 4-8, Figure 4-18 does not show any abrupt
changes in the tail flow and all three tanks are filled equally. Adding a PI controller
removes most of the irreproducibility from each run and allows for more sophisticated
monitoring techniques to be effectively implemented.
A PI controller and pressure transducer were installed at the surge tank outlet.
The pressure transducer measured the height of water in the surge tank, and the PI
controller would adjust a ball valve to maintain a set water level. In this setup, the total
outflow from the surge tank is completely controlled by the PI controller. The ratio
between the product and tail legs is still controlled by the throttling valves, but with the
total outflow controlled by the PI controller the throttling valves do not have to be
constantly adjusted during operation. As a result, the ratio between the product and tail
legs remains, consistent and the mass balance of the system is more stable. Figure
4-19 shows the PI controller and pressure transducer system installed at the ORNL
Facility.
Tracking the CID of the facility is the primary way to search for atypical activity.
The CID is calculated by extracting the times when the station is in the Draining or
Filling state, taking the derivative of the instantaneous station weight to approximate the
mass flow rate, and then summing the mass flow rate for each station. When the
stations are in the Static or Empty state, the mass flow rate should be zero. But,
because of sensor noise the mass flow rate may be non-zero. Including these times in
the CID calculation increases the variation. During normal operation, the CID should
remain stable. However, with the manual control scheme, the CID grows to almost 40
kg before returning to approximately 3 kg. Figure 4-20 shows the CID plot for the March
27, 2009 experimental run (the process station profiles are shown in Figure 4-8). The
top plot in Figure 4-20 shows the CID for each station type. The inventory difference
was calculated with respect to material entering and leaving the surge tank, so feed
stations are positive as their material was entering the surge tank, and product and tail
stations are negative because their material was leaving the surge tank. The CID for
each station shows how much material was processed at each station. The bottom plot
of Figure 4-20 is just the sum of the CID for each station. This plot shows how the
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Figure 4-19. The updated control scheme at the ORNL Facility. The installation of a
pressure transducer with a PI control valve removed a human element from control of
the facility, removing the largest source of variability in facility operation. The pressure
transducer gave a measure of the water level in the surge tank, and the PI controller
adjusted the valve to maintain a set level.
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Figure 4-20. Plots of the cumulative inventory difference from the March 27, 2009 run,
when the facility was still under a manual control scheme.
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amount of material in the surge tank is changes. Ideally this value should fluctuate
around zero, but with a manual control scheme the operator was not able to effectively
control the surge tank level. The same plots are shown in Figure 4-21, but in this run
the PI controller had been installed in the facility. Importantly, the system CID peaks at
1.3 kg and reaches a stable value of 0.6, whereas in Figure 4-20 the system CID peaks
at 40 kg and never has a stable value. The bottom plot of Figure 4-21 shows a few
features related to the facility operation. The large initial spike comes from the material
transport delay of the system. As water is pumped from the feed stations, it takes a
finite amount of time to reach the surge tank. Even more significant is that the PI
controller is not turned on immediately, allowing the surge tank to accumulate water.
After the PI controller is turned on, it takes more time for the surge tank level to return to
baseline. After this startup time (usually about 15 minutes), the total CID reaches its
steady state value. The larger spikes during this stable period are correlated with the
switching of feed tanks. The large negative spike in Figure 4-21 at ~18:15:00 is caused
because the tank at Feed Station 3 is taken offline. The system quickly returns to its
steady state value as Feed Station 1 is brought online. The final downward spike at the
end of processing is again due to transport delay. As the Feed tanks are fully emptied
and no new tanks are brought online, the material takes a few seconds to be processed
and enter the product and tail tanks. At the end of the run, -0.3 kg is the total inventory
difference. Generally one would expect these values to be positive due to material
holdup in the system (i.e. more material enters the surge tank or mock cascade area
than leaves it), but at the ORNL facility the large volume of water in the surge tank
allows more material to be removed from the mock cascade area than enters. In a real
facility, this would be analogous to the removal of residual holdup from previous
operation.
The Sequential Probability Ratio Test was used to search for abnormal facility
operation. This test determines if a sequence of numbers comes from a specified
distribution or not. Since during normal operation the total CID should remain stable
(except for at the beginning and end of operation, as explained previously), the SPRT
was used to determine if the total CID changed in a statistically significant way during
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Figure 4-21. Cumulative inventory difference from July 19, 2010, after installation of the
PI controller. Plot (a) is the CID for each station, and plot (b) is the total CID calculated
by summing the data in plot (a).
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operation. The input to the SPRT is the mean and variance of the known distribution,
and the probability of a missed alarm and false alarm. The probability of a missed
alarm and false alarm was set to 10% and 1% respectively. However, as the uranium
blend-down facility analysis, requiring several consecutive points to fail the SPRT
significantly reduces the false alarm and missed alarm rates. 5 consecutive points were
required to fail the SPRT before abnormal operation was identified. Requiring
consecutive points to fail the SPRT slowed down the speed with which abnormal
operation was identified. Since the data was downsampled to 0.2 Hz, abnormal facility
operation could be detected in a minimum of 25 seconds. Considering that a typical run
took over 3 hours, delaying detection by 25 seconds was insignificant. The mean and
variance was directly calculated by at a window of 50 points in the total cumulative
inventory plot. The window was chosen about 15 minutes into the run, so that it was not
contaminated by the facility startup transients. Additionally, the CID was smoothed
using a median filter to remove the spikes associated with bringing tanks online and
offline. The raw and smoothed CID and the results of the SPRT are shown in Figure
4-22. In the bottom plot, the red circles represent times when the data failed the SPRT
and blue represents normal operation. Even during normal operation, the data was
expected to temporarily fail the SPRT during startup and shutdown transients. Times
when the data failed the SPRT will indicate when the facility was not operating at under
normal steady state conditions. In Figure 4-22, the stable CID lasted from 17:45 to
about19:00, which was a total of 900 points at a downsampled rate of 0.2 Hz. There
are no false alarms during this period, so even though the specified false alarm rate was
1%, the true false alarm rate is much smaller.
The described process state identification, cylinder counting algorithms, and
SPRT alarms were written in a simple, intuitive MATLAB GUI. The MATLAB GUI
provides interactive plots of all the station scales, automatically generates a summary
report, and provides the option of automatically comparing a summary report to a
material declaration sheet. The GUI incorporates all of the previously described
analysis and is designed to be a software tool for a facility inspector.
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Figure 4-22. The cumulative inventory difference and SPRT results for the July 19, 2009
run. The cumulative inventory difference was smoothed with a median filter, and the
mean and variance was taken from a window of data points right after the startup
transient. The bottom plot shows the result of the SPRT. The red circles represent
when the data failed the SPRT, and blue represents normal operation.
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4.2.4 GUI Development
LoadCellEvents is a MATLAB based Graphical User Interface (GUI) designed as
a tool for load cell monitoring at the ORNL Mock Feed and Withdrawal facility. The GUI
provides an interactive platform for plotting load cell data, calculating the total number of
cylinders and the amount of material processed, and examining the cumulative
inventory difference. There are three inputs to the GUI: a text file from the process
scales, a material declaration sheet, and a process scale declaration sheet. The
outputs are: plots of the raw data, station state plots, cumulative ID plots, ID analysis
plots, SPRT alarm plots, a process scale summary report, a process scale declaration
sheet, and a comparison sheet used to reconcile a material declaration sheet and
process declaration sheet. The program has two main parts: PlotEvents, which loads
and plots the process scale data, and AnalyzeEvents which performs all of the analysis.
A block diagram of the program is provided in Figure 4-23.
4.2.4.1 Using PlotEvents
PlotEvents is the program section that loads the process scale data and provides
plots of each station. The input to the GUI is a simple text file containing 10 columns: 1)
the data in yyyy-mm-dd format, 2) the time in HH:MM:SS format, 3)-10) the weights, in
kg, for the 3 feed, 3 products, and 2 tail stations respectively. A sample input file is
provided in the Appendix.
Double clicking the LoadCellEvents executable opens the PlotEvents window
shown in Figure 4-24. Selecting the “Load Data” button prompts the user to select an
input file. Once the file is selected, the raw data from the file is plotted. The user can
select which stations to plot by clicking the appropriate tank station button. The time
period of interest can be entered in the time box. The plot will not update until the
“Replot” button is selected. The “New Window” button opens the current plot in a
separate window. The “Analyze Events” button is explained in the next section.
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Figure 4-23. Block Diagram of the MATLAB GUI. The inputs to the GUI are shown as
blue lines and the outputs are shown as dotted lines. The solid black lines represent
different sections of the GUI.
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Figure 4-24. The opening PlotEvents window after data has been loaded. Clicking the
Load Data button prompts the user to load a data file. Initially every station is plotted,
but the user can select difference stations and then use the Replot button to update the
plot.
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4.2.4.2 Analyzing Events
Once the operator has inspected the raw data, clicking the “Analyze Events”
button will open a new window, AnalyzeEvents shown in Figure 4-25. Four different
types of analysis are available and can be selected using the four toggle buttons in the
top right corner: System states, Cumulative ID (Inventory Difference), ID Analysis,
Prognostics. In addition to the four types of analysis, there are three buttons available
to the user: Replot, New Window, and Write Summary. The Replot and New Window
button are used for updating plots and plotting data in a new window, respectively. The
Write Summary button will be described after the types of analysis are discussed.
The first analysis, System States, provides plots of the station state identification
algorithms. The allowed states are Empty, Static, Draining, or Filling. The Empty state
is for when there is nothing placed on the process station. The Static state is when
there is a tank on the station but no material is being removed of added to the tank.
The Draining and Filling state is when material is actively being removed or placed into
a tank. Different stations can be selected using the Tank Selection buttons provided
next to the plot; however, only an individual station can be plotted at a time. These
plots were included as a visual check to ensure the state categorization algorithms were
performed correctly. If there are any discrepancies between the summary report and a
material declaration sheet, these plots provide assurance that the discrepancies were
due to incorrect station analysis.
The second type of analysis is the Cumulative ID. As with the System States
analysis, the primary purpose is to provide a visual check. The Cumulative ID analyses
the cumulative amount of material processed at each station: positive values for when
material enters the mock cascade area (feed material) and negative values if material
leaves the mock cascade area (product and tail material). Additionally, the total CID is
plotted. Individual stations can be selected via the buttons next to the plot. Any
combination of stations can be selected, but the figure will not update until the Replot
button is pressed. Figure 4-26 shows the AnalyzeEvents window when the Cumulative
ID analysis is plotted.
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Figure 4-25. The window opened when the Analyze Events button was pressed. Four
different types of analysis are available and can be selected using the four toggle
buttons in the top right corner. The initial analysis is the System States.
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Figure 4-26. The AnalyzeEvents window when the Cumulative ID analysis is selected.
Different stations can be selected and plotted together. Additionally, the total
cumulative inventory difference can be plotted.
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The third type of analysis is called ID Analysis. This analysis looks only at the
total cumulative ID analysis. Figure 6 shows the AnalyzeEvents window when ID
analysis is selected. This window provides two plots. The top plot can be toggled
between the cumulative ID and a Gaussian fit to the cumulative ID. The first option
plots the raw and smoothed CID (Figure 4-27). The second option plots the makes a
histogram of the CID values and fits them to a normal curve (Figure 4-28). The fourth
analysis, Prognostics, is currently non-functional. The button is included in anticipation
of future research, being performed by David Hooper, to predict the amount of material
(if any) that will be unaccounted for if the current operation trend continues.
The “Write Summary Report” button examines each station to calculate the
number of tanks placed on the scale, the number of tanks processed, the start and end
time of a tank processed, the initial and final weight of each tank processed, and the
total inventory difference (Feed - Tail+Product). A sample report is shown at the end.
Additionaly, a process scale declaration sheet is also created. The process scale
declaration sheet is compared to a material declaration sheet to ensure that all the
material processed was declared on the material declaration sheet. A sample process
summary report is provided in the Appendix. A sample process scale declaration sheet
is shown the undeclared activity case study.
Once the “Write Summary Report” is clicked, a new button becomes available:
“Compare to Declaration”. This button prompts the user to select a material declaration
sheet and a process declaration sheet. These two declaration sheets are then
compared to each other, matching tanks based on their initial and final weights. Ideally,
tanks would be matched based on their unique tank ID, but the tank ID is not recorded
in the process scale data. Unmatched tanks are highlight as undeclared activity. Figure
4-29 shows the Compare to Declaration button available after the Write Summary
Report button has been clicked.
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Figure 4-27. The AnalyzeEvents window when ID analysis is selected. The default top
plot is the raw and smoothed cumulative ID difference. The bottom plot is the SPRT
alarm. Red indicates an atypical state; blue represents a normal state. Startup and
shutdown transients are recognized as atypical operation. The bottom plot is the
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) alarm. When the facility is under normal
steady state operation, the CID should be stable. The SPRT alarm is a statistical test to
determine if the CID is remaining stable. The red portion indicates that the CID is not
stable, while the blue portion means it is stable. The SPRT alarm provides indication of
changes to facility operation and is meant as an inspector tool to recognize atypical
facility operations.
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Figure 4-28. The AnalyzeEvents window when ID analysis is selected and the
Gaussian ID plot is selected. Instead of the CID vs. time, the top plot is a histogram of
the CID fitted to a normal curve. The bottom plot remains unchanged.
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Figure 4-29. The AnalyzeEvents window after the Write Summary Report button has
been executed. A new button becomes available: Compare to Declaration, which
allows the user to select a material declaration sheet and process declaration sheet
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4.2.4.3 Finding Undeclared Activity
Undeclared activity is when an operator processes material without first weight
the tanks on an accountability scale. Therefore, the tank will appear on the process
declaration sheet but not the material declaration sheet. For example, consider the
material declaration sheet from October 14 and 15, 2010 (Table 4-4). This sheet
provides a tank Identification number, an initial and final weight, and the date and time
the tank was weighed.
Using the PlotEvents software to analyze the process scale data from that time
period and selecting the Write Summary Report in the AnalyzeEvents window will
generate a process summary report. In the Process Summary Report from October 14
and 15, 2010, (Table 4-5) the start and stop times are not recorded, only the date. Most
importantly, the tank IDs are not recorded because the tank IDs are not recorded when
a tank is placed on a process scale.
Once the “Write Summary Report” button has been selected, the material
declaration sheet and process declaration sheet can be automatically compared using
the newly available “Compare to Declaration” button. This button will prompt the user to
load a material declaration sheet and process summary sheet for comparison.
Because the tank IDs are not available in the process summary report,
reconciling the material declaration sheet with the process declaration sheet was done
by comparing each tanks initial and final weight (Table 4-6). Reconciled tanks are
displayed first, showing the tank ID and the process station they were at. Tanks
appearing on the material declaration sheet but not the process declaration sheet are
shown next. These represent tanks onsite but that have not been processed. Finally,
the undeclared tanks appearing in the process declaration sheet are shown. These are
the tanks indicative of undeclared activity.
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Table 4-4. Material Declaration Sheet for October 14 and 15, 2010
Tank ID
25G04
25G06
25G05
10L02
10L03

Initial
Weight (kg)
85.09
141.44
35.32
1.148
1.152

Date

Time

14-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10

3:30 PM
10:15 AM
10:15 AM
10:15 AM
10:15 AM
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Final
Weight (kg)
35.22
35.56
141.01
10.399
1.148

Date

Time

15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10

11:05 AM
12:05 PM
12:05 PM
1:05 PM
1:05 PM

Table 4-5 Process Declaration Sheet for October 14 and 15, 2010
Station
Feed1
Feed2
Feed3
Product1
Product2
Tail1
Tail2
Tail2

Initial
Weight (kg)
141.74
140.76
85.43
1.15
1.16
35.75
35.48
36.2

Date
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010

Final
Weight (kg)
35.91
35.49
36.08
3.24
10.4
141.38
81.88
132.37
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Date

Delta (kg)

15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010
15-10-2010

105.83
105.27
49.35
-2.09
-9.24
-105.63
-46.4
-96.17

Table 4-6. Results of comparing the Material Declaration Sheet and Process
Declaration Sheet. Reconciled tanks are shown first, then un-matched tanks listed on
the material declaration sheet, and finally undeclared tanks.

Tank ID
25G04

Station
Acc't
Feed3
Acc't
Feed1
Acc't
Product2
Acc't
Tail1

25G06
10L02
25G05

Tank ID
10L03

Reconciled Tanks
Initial
Date
Weight (kg)
Date
14-Oct-10
85.09
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
85.43
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
141.44
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
141.74
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
1.148
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
1.16
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
35.32
15-Oct-10
15-Oct-10
35.75
15-Oct-10

Final
Weight (kg)
35.22
36.08
35.56
35.91
10.399
10.4
141.01
141.38

Un-Matched Tanks From Material Declaration Sheet
Initial
Final
Date
Time
Date
Time
Weight (kg)
Weight (kg)
1.152
15-Oct-10 10:15 AM
1.148
15-Oct-10 1:05 PM

Station
Feed2
Product1
Tail2
Tail2

Undeclared Tanks at Process Stations
Initial
Final
Date
Date
Weight (kg)
Weight (kg)
140.76
15-10-2010
35.49
15-10-2010
1.15
15-10-2010
3.24
15-10-2010
35.48
15-10-2010
81.88
15-10-2010
36.2
15-10-2010
132.37
15-10-2010
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Delta (kg)
105.27
-2.09
-46.4
-96.17

Delta (kg)
49.87
49.35
105.88
105.83
-9.251
-9.24
-105.69
-105.63

Delta
(kg)
0.004

4.2.4.4 Finding A Diversion
In the case of material diversion, the process declaration sheet and material
declaration sheet will be in agreement. For small diversions the material holdup ,may
fall within acceptable values. Even for large diversions, makeup material could be
placed in the appropriate tank to satisfy the mass balance. However, the total CID plot
provided by the ID analysis option in the AnalyzeEvents window provides a way to
search for diversions. A plot from normal operation is shown in Figure 4-30. The CID
remains stable with the exception of startup and shutdown transients. The SPRT alarm
signals on the transients, but does not alarm during steady state operation. Figure 4-31
shows the same analysis during a diversion. The diversion data is from June 7, 2010
operation. During this operation material was diverted from the product leg starting
around 17:45, the diversion continued until approximately 19:12, but material
processing continued until 20:38. Around 0.6 kg of material was diverted. However,
once material was finished processing, material was reintroduced into the product tank
so that the final cumulative inventory was within normal bounds. The SPRT alarm
triggers within a few minutes and would alert an inspector that there was an atypical
operation.
4.2.4.5 Detecting Masked Enrichment
In the case of masked enrichment, undeclared material was processed in parallel
with declared material and the undeclared tanks were not placed on a station scale.
Therefore process scale data was not available to identify the undeclared material.
Additionally, the total inflow and outflow of the mock cascade area was equal. The
operator was trying to simultaneously divert undeclared material away from the process
scale while ensuring that the correct mass to the declared tanks. Therefore, the CID
was not as stable as during normal operation. Figure 4-32 shows the CID during the
masked enrichment run and the associated SPRT alarms. While the SPRT did alarm, it
was not has definitive as in Figure 4-31. With a more sophisticated facility, this scenario
could be hidden from an inspector. The CID did not give much insight in this scenario
because most of the effected systems were inside the mock cascade area. If facility
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Figure 4-30. The ID analysis of normal operation. The CID remains stable with the
exception of startup and shutdown transients. The SPRT alarm triggers during the
transients, but not steady state operation.
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Figure 4-31. The ID analysis of a diversion operation. The cumulative inventory
difference does not remain stable. The SPRT alarm identifies the deviation from steady
state operation.
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Figure 4-32. SPRT alarms during a masked enrichment run.
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data were used in addition to process scale data, this scenario could be identified by
looking for changes in the facility data. To this end, the MATLAB Simulink model was
used to generate data for a masked enrichment scenario. The simulated data included
both the process scale data and the facility control data. An AAKR model was trained
using the mass flow rate (approximated from the derivative of the process scale data),
and PI controller voltage.
For this simulation, the undeclared feed material was 10% of the declared feed
flow. The expected feed flow was lower than the actual feed flow because actual feed
flow included undeclared material processed in parallel. Because the PI controller was
sensitive to the total feed flow, the additional undeclared feed flow causes the PI
controller valve to open more than expected. Therefore, this scenario was identified by
looking at the residuals between the measured PI voltage and the predicted PI voltage.
Figure 4-33 shows feed flow rates, the PI voltage residuals, and the SPRT alarm
corresponding to the masked enrichment simulation. This scenario represented a
limiting case for load cell analysis. However, by incorporating facility control data and
developing an AAKR model, the atypical facility operation would have been identified.
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Figure 4-33. Simulated masked enrichment detection. Because the feed flow was
higher than expected, the PI voltage was larger than predicted. Using an SPRT alarm
on the residuals clearly identified that atypical operation had taken place.
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5

CONCLUSIONS
Developing automated routines for safeguards monitoring is a burgeoning field in

the safeguards community. While process monitoring has been applied across several
industries, its application and development for safeguards is still in its infancy. Much of
the research in safeguards monitoring has focused specifically on two types of facilities:
nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, and GCEPs. Traditional safeguards relied on
inspection and authenticated measurements to perform material balances. However,
integrating the wealth of unauthenticated data typically collected by facilities for process
monitoring with traditional safeguards measures provides a cost-effective way to reduce
the inspector burden while providing a more complete safeguard monitoring system.
The first step of this research examined the application process monitoring
techniques applied to a simulated uranium blend down facility. The goals of this
research were to identify what safeguards conclusions could be drawn from the
application of an on-line monitoring system and to see if the monitoring system could be
expanded to include signals from radiation detectors specific to nuclear processing
facilities. To this end, a MATLAB Simulink model was used to generate normal facility
data and diversions ranging from 0.1% to 10% of the HEU flow. The Simulink model
included three flow sensors, three weight scales, and two fissile mass flow meters. The
fissile mass flow meters incorporated radiation sensors to measure the mass flow of
235

U (a complete description of the fissile mass flow meters can be found in [56]). Four

different models were created based on the Auto-Associative Kernel Regression.

In

each model, simulated data from normal operation was used to train the model. The
model was then tested on the diversion data to determine its sensitivity to a diversion.
In the first two models, signals from the fissile mass flow meters were not included as
part of the monitoring system. The first and second model differed in that the second
model’s data was preprocessed with data reconciliation. Models three and four were
similar to models one and two, except the fissile mass flow meter signals were included
in the model. Comparing the models provided a quantitative measure of the
improvements gained by including radiation sensors and preprocessing the data with
data reconciliation. All models had similar performance on the unfaulted data, but
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neither of the first two models was able to detect a 10% diversion of the HEU leg.
However, models 3 and 4 were both able to detect a 1% diversion from the HEU leg,
showing that incorporating simulated radiation signals is expected to greatly increase
the sensitivity of the monitoring system to a diversion. While the application of data
reconciliation in model 4 did not greatly increase the accuracy compared to model 3, it
did significantly improve the ELUM and SPRT detectability. This research showed the
development of an auto associative kernel regression model for safeguards monitoring
and the benefits of preprocessing with data reconciliation.
The second phase focused on developing a load cell monitoring system for the
ORNL mock feed and withdrawal facility. The ORNL mock feed and withdrawal facility
is a continuous batch feed water processing facility. This facility provides realistic data
to develop and test automated monitoring techniques. The load cell monitoring system
employed an automatic cylinder counting algorithm to extract the number of tanks and
the amount of material processed at each process scale. This data was then
automatically compared to a material declaration sheet to search for undeclared activity.
Traditionally, verifying the information on a material declaration sheet required an
inspector to tediously reweigh every cylinder on an authenticated scale. However, due
to the sheer number of cylinders at a facility, only a small random sample is reweighed
during a monthly inspection. Detecting undeclared activity would require an inspector to
find an undeclared cylinder while reweighing a small random sample. Applying load cell
monitoring to a facility, even though the data comes from unauthenticated scales,
provided an efficient way to search for undeclared activity. Additionally, atypical facility
operation could be identified by tracking the CID. For instance, material diversion could
be detected by tracking the CID. Currently, facilities are not required to report the CID.
The masked enrichment scenario represented a limiting case. This scenario could not
be easily identified only using load cell monitoring. However, simulated data showed
that incorporating load cell data with the PI voltage in an AAKR model would have been
able to identify the atypical operation. The load cell monitoring system cumulated in a
MATLAB-based-GUI that incorporated process scale state identification, automatic
cylinder counting algorithms, material declaration sheet verification (through process
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scale cylinder counting), and incorporated a SPRT alarm system for when the total CID
did not remain stable. While a SPRT alarm did not specifically signify clandestine
intentions, it did highlight times when the facility was not operated as expected. An
inspector could use this data as part of an information driven inspection, rather than just
examining small random samples. The GUI was designed to be a software tool for
inspectors, possibly providing a means to remotely authenticate facility declarations and
reduce the frequency and manpower required for a facility inspection.

5.1

Summary of Contributions
This research explored the development of a safeguards monitoring system for

two specific facilities: a simulated uranium blend down facility and the ORNL mock feed
and withdrawal facility. For the simulated facility, a safeguards model was developed
based on the Auto-associated Kernel Regression architecture which was augmented to
include data-reconciliation and radiation sensors. Incorporating radiation sensors and
data-reconciliation should allow diversions as small as 2% of the HEU leg to be
detected.
For the ORNL facility, a load cell monitoring system was developed. This system
included an automated routine to calculate the amount of material processed, count the
number of cylinders, and search for atypical facility operations using the CID and the
SPRT alarm. The load cell monitoring system cumulated in the development of a
MATLAB-based GUI which could be used as a tool for inspectors to quickly and
possibly remotely use facility data to draw safeguards conclusions.

5.2

Future Work
The area of safeguards monitoring holds many opportunities for continuing

research beyond the scope of this dissertation. Several such areas have been
mentioned throughout this report; a few specific ones are outlined below.
This research focused on developing a monitoring system used specifically to
draw safeguards conclusions. The main monitoring method for the uranium blend down
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facility was based on the AAKR, which was augmented with data reconciliation.
However several different types of models have historically been used for process
monitoring and optimization, and future work could examine the strengths and
weaknesses of using different monitoring models. Also, looking at a number of different
facilities would provide a better foundation for determine the optimum safeguards
monitoring model. Additionally, fault detection was determined using the SPRT test.
The specified false and missed alarm rates were 1% and 10%, respectively. But, by
requiring 5 consecutive points to fail before a fault is declared, the true false and missed
alarm rates are much lower. Quantifying the true false and missed alarm rates was
beyond the scope of this research, but is an important step in quantifying a real-world
monitoring system. One major limitation of this research was that the data was
generated with a highly idealized MATLAB Simulink model. Real world data would
likely have many other features, such as increased noise or a more complicated
operation, which would degrade the performance of the model. A future area of
research could examine developing these models for an actual facility, finding the limits
of detection, and identifying the true missed alarm and false alarm rate.
The second phase of research examined developing a load cell monitoring. This
load cell monitoring system used unauthenticated process scales to draw safeguards
conclusions about a facility. A general cylinder counting algorithm provided an efficient
way to validate facility declarations and to search for undeclared activity. With a
modern control scheme, atypical facility operation could be identified by employing a
SPRT alarm. Future work could examine incorporating other facility data and its effects
on safeguards monitoring. For instance, the masked enrichment scenario represented
the limiting case when only the process scales are included in the model. However,
using simulated data, it was shown that including other facility data, namely the PI
controller voltage, into an AAKR model would easily detect this scenario. While the
SPRT was useful for finding atypical operation, more sophisticated residual analysis
could provide inspector with a way to identify different scenarios (such as a diversion,
sensor drift, or new equipment installation), rather than just identifying atypical
operation.
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One major hurdle to implementing online safeguards monitoring is what data are
made available to an inspector and the possibility of transferring data offsite. The effect
of incorporating other facility data and its benefit to safeguards monitoring should be
examined. Using simulated data, it was shown that incorporating facility control data
with load cell data into an AAKR model provided a way to identify atypical operation that
would not have been possible using only load cell data. While safeguards monitoring is
usually viewed from an inspector perspective and seen as a burden to a facility, further
research could identify the potential benefits of a facility incorporating a safeguards
monitoring system, specifically in reducing the frequency of inspections and the length
of each inspection.
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APPENDIX A: Relevant Equations to the Uranium Blend-Down Model
The simulated uranium blend down facility processes single tanks of UF6 at each
station leg. A tank is loaded on each station, and then HEUF6 and LEUF6 are blended
together to produce PLEUF6. The three types of sensors are: weight (kg), gas velocity
(m/sec), and the Fissile Mass Flow Meter (counts/sec). This section will give a brief
overview of the relevant physics. Default values were taken from [56 - 59] or
approximated based on system geometry.
For the HEU and LEU legs, a mass flow rate (kg/sec) is first specified. The
instantaneous tank weight at LEUF6 and HEUF6 legs is given by:

Where

is the mass in the tank (kg) at time t,

tank, and

is the initial mass of material in the

is the mass flow rate (kg/sec). This default values for the mass flow rate
-3

are 8.6 * 10 kg/sec for the LEUF6 leg and 2.6 * 10-3 kg/sec for the HEUF6 leg. For the
PLEUF6 the tank weight is given by:

Where

is the LEUF6 mass flow rate,

is the HEUF6 mass flow rate, and

is the mass flow rate of the diversion. The mass flow rate of the diversion is
usually specified as a percent of the HEUF6 leg. For normal operation it is zero.
The gas flow velocities are given by:

Where

is the mass flow rate (kg/sec),

(kg/m3), and

is the drain rate (m/sec),

is the density

is the pipe cross sectional area (m2). The pipe cross sectional area is

9.2 * 10-3 m2 for the HEUF6 leg and 3.77 * 10-2 for the LEUF6 and PLEUF6 legs. The
density of the UF6 is 0.57 kg/m3.
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The PLEUF6 enrichment is calculated in the blending tee and is governed by the
following equation:

Where E is the percent enrichment for each leg. The default values are 90% and 1.5%
for the HEUF6 and LEUF6 leg, respectively.

refers to the mass flow rate in kg/sec.

The subscripts p, l, h, and d, refer to the PLEUF6 leg, LEUF6 leg, HEUF6 leg, and the
diversion.
The final piece of instrumentation is the Fissile Mass Flow Meter. The FMFM
measures the 235U flow by counting the number of delayed gammas that appear after a
fission event. The 235U flow is given by

where

refers to the mass flow rate (kg/sec), E is the material enrichment, and MF is

the mass fraction of the uranium in UF6 :

235 is the atomic mass of

235

U, 238 is the atomic mass of 238U, 19 is the atomic mass of

Fluorine, and 6 is the number of Fluorine atoms per Uranium atom in UF6. For this
simulation, the Fissile Mass Flow Meter response was assumed to be linearly
proportional to the 235U flow. The equation governing the 235U mass flow to Fissile Mass
Flow Meter counts is:

where S is the neutron source strength in neutrons per sec, Solid Angle is the solid
angle seen by the source neutron (dimensionless), Pfission is the probability that a
neutron that has entered the material flow interacts with 235U atom and causes a
fission(units of fission*sec/neutron), Pgamma is the probability of a delayed gamma from a
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fission (dimensionless), and Edetector is the detector efficiency (dimensionless). The
simulated values are S = 1.04 * 108 neutrons/sec, Solid Angle = 0.2, Pfission = 6.75* 10-5,
Pgamma = 0.1, and Edetector = 0.22. Multiplying Solid Angle, Pfission, Pgamma, and Edetector
gives the probability of a source neutron causing a fission in a
7

235

U atom to be 2.97 * 10-

. With the simulated neutron source, there are 30 counts produced per a kg of

235

U

irradiated.
The actual physics of the FMFM meter are much more complicated than described.
The source strength was chosen to mimic a 3-4 micrograms of Cf-252 spontaneous
fission source. The solid angle was chosen assuming that only 1/5 th of the source
neutron have a chance to interact with the UF6 stream. This assumes that the pipe
encompasses approximately 1/5th of the area seen by the neutron source. Pfission was
calculated by multiplying the U235 fission cross section by the number density of the UF6
gas.
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APPENDIX B: Relevant Equations to ORNL Facility Model
The simulated ORNL mock feed and withdrawal system was used to identify what
the effects of changing the control scheme would be and to simulate data for
development of an AAKR model. In this facility, a cylinder is loaded on each station,
and feed water is pumped into a surge tank and then drains into a product and tails
tank. The process scales are the only sensors. This section will give a brief overview of
the relevant physics.
For a given mass flow rate, the mass of water inside a cylinder is:

where

is the mass in the cylinder (kg) at time t,

the cylinder, and

is the initial mass of material in

is the mass flow rate (kg/sec). The max feed mass flow rate

isapproximately 2 kg/min.
The feed water flows into the surge tank, and the volume of the tank changes
according to:

where

and

are the mass flow rates into and out of the surge tank (kg/sec),

the density of water (kg/m3), and

is

is the effective Surge Tank cross sectional area

(m2). The mass flow rate out is proportional to the height of water in the tank and the
valve positioning:

where

is the amount the outlet valve is opened (ranges from 0 to 1),
is the outlet pipe cross sectional area (m2),

is the density of water (kg/m3),

g is the gravitational constant 9.8 m/sec2, and H is the water height in the tank (m).
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is determined by the PI controller based on the difference between the
setpoint height of water in the surge tank and the measured height of water in the surge
tank. The PI constants are adjusted based on the desired responses of the system.
The error function is:

when the measured height is larger than the setpoint, the error is larger and the valve
opens more.
The surge tank water level is measured by a pressure transducer; the equation
relating the pressure to the height of water in a tank is:

where P is the pressure in Pascal,

is the density of water (kg/m3), g is the gravitational

constant 9.8 m/sec2, and H is the height of water in the surge tank (meters).
The flow to the product and tail legs is controlled by throttling valves. These
valves are opened to a set point and are then left alone during operation. Therefore,
the flow to the tail or product leg is just a percent of the flow out of the surge tank.
Typically, about 3% goes to the product leg and 97% goes to the tail leg.
The weight of a tail or product cylinder is given by:

where

is the mass in the cylinder (kg) at time t,

the cylinder, and

is the mass flow rate (kg/sec).
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is the initial mass of material in

APPENDIX C: Descriptions of Algorithms used by PlotEvents
This section will describe some of the algorithms used by the PlotEvents
software. A combination of inherent MATLAB functions and user-written functions are
called at various times throughout the program. When feasible, they are presented in
the order in which they are called.
1) When the “Load Data” button is clicked in the PlotEvents reader and a data file
is selected, the pathname and file name are passed to the ReadORNL.m function. This
is a user-written function that simply loads the data file into two matrices: data - 7
columns for the 7 process stations, with the rows corresponding to the weights at each
time step, and time - one column corresponding to the time stamps.
2) The data is then downsampled using the MATLAB inherent downsample.m
function. The data is downsampled from 1 hertz to 0.2 hertz (one sample every 5
seconds instead of every second). This is done primarily to reduce the amount of noise
associated with loading and unloading tanks and to reduce the amount of storage space
required.
3) The data is plotted and the xticklabel.m function is called. This is a userdefined function which correctly fixes the x-axis ticks on the plots. This function is called
whenever the plot is updated or a when the data is plotted in a new window.
4) When the “AnalyzeEvents” Button is pressed the raw data is passed to the
AnalyzeEvents Window. A new matrix, cdata, is defined being the same size as the
data matrix, but all zeros. This matrix will hold the state number for each station at
each instant in time. The raw data is smoothed by the SmoothORNL.m function. This
is a user-defined function that selectively smoothes the data based on its state, defined
in the cdata matrix. The smoothing function is a median filter (inherent to MATLAB)
with differing time windows. The smooth data is recorded in the sdata matrix.
5) Initially, all tank states are defined as zero (since cdata is initially all zeros).
The stations are then initially categorized by the ClassifyWeightORNL.m function. This
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is a user-defined function that defines a state number based on the current station
weight. The only state defined in the ClassifyWeightORNL.m function is the Empty
state. It uses a hard threshold to define when a station is empty. If station weight is
below 0.5 kg then the station is said to be in the Empty state. The state number or 1
corresponds to the Empty state.
5) Once the empty states have been defined and the cdata matrix has been
updated accordingly, the SmoothORNL.m function is used to selectively resmooth the
stations during the Empty state. This helps removes some spikes associated with the
loading and unloading of a tank.
6) Once the data has been resmoothed and the sdata matrix updated, the
stations are further categorized by the ClassifyDiffWeightORNL.m function. The first
categorization performed by the ClassifyWeightORNL.m function essentially allows the
state to be either Empty (state number = 1 in cdata) or undefined (state number = 0 in
cdata). The ClassifyDiffWeightORNL.m is a user-defined function that determines the
station state based on the instantaneous derivative of the weight. The weight derivative
during the times when the system state is undefined is calculated and compared to
defined thresholds. If the derivative is between +/-0.2 kg/sec (for feed and tail tanks) or
between +/-0.02 kg/sec (for product tanks) the station state is defined as Static and the
state number assigned is 2. If the derivative is between -3 and -0.2 kg/sec (for feed and
tail tanks) or between -0.3 and -0.02 kg/sec (for product tanks) the station state is
defined as Draining and the state number assigned is 3, If the derivative is between
+0.2 and +3 kg/sec (for feed and tail tanks) or between +0.02 and +0.3 kg/sec (for
product tanks) the station state is defined as Filling and the state number assigned is 4.
Derivatives that do not fall within these thresholds are left undefined (state number = 0)
7) The next step is to remove the undefined (state number = 0) states in cdata.
This is accomplished by the CombineZerosORNL.m function. This is a user-defined
function that sets all undefined states to the start occurring before the undefined period.
For example if the station is in the Empty state and then briefly falls into the undefined
state before entering the Static state, the period of time when the state is undefined
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would be assigned the Empty state. This generally occurs when tanks are loaded and
unloaded as large spikes may cause large derivatives that fall outside the thresholds
defined in the ClassifyDiffWeightORNL.m function.
8) At this point, all elements of cdata should be non-zero. The amount of time a
station remains in each state is checked by the CheckLengthORNL.m function. This is
a user defined function that checks how long a station remains in a specified state,
compares it to a threshold, and then removes the state if its length is below the
threshold. For example, if a station is in the Static state and then for a single time step
enters the Draining state (most likely as the result of measurement noise), followed by
immediately re-entering the Static state, then the Draining state is reassigned as static.
The static and Empty states must last at least 5 consecutive time steps, while the
Draining and Filling states must last at least 30 consecutive time steps.
9) A final check is performed by the CheckStaticORNL.m function. This is a user
defined function that checks the Static state for derivatives that would correspond to the
addition or removal of a tank. For instance, a -35.0 kg/sec derivative or higher is
associated with removal of an empty feed tank. These times are assigned the Empty
state.
10) Now the station states are completely defined in the cdata matrix. The
TanksProcessedORNL.m function extracts the number of tanks placed on the stations,
processed on the station, the start and end time of all processed tanks, and the start
and end weights of all processed tanks. This is done by examining the cdata matrix
and the state transitions. This information is printed to a summary report when the
“Write Report” button is clicked in the AnalyzeEvents window
11) The cdata, sdata, and data matrices are then passed to the
InventoryDifference Window. This happens automatically once the
TanksProcessedORNL.m function has completed. The CumIDORNL.m function is used
to calculate the CID for each station. The CID starts as zero until the station state
becomes either Draining or Filling. Then the total amount of material processed each
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time step is cumulatively added. During times when the station is Static or Empty, the
differential inventory difference is assumed zero.
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APPENDIX D: Sample Input File For PlotEvents
Date
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25
2010-05-25

Time
16:00:00
16:00:01
16:00:02
16:00:03
16:00:04
16:00:05
16:00:06
16:00:07
16:00:08
16:00:09
16:00:10

Feed1
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100
141.1100

Feed2
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434
142.4434

Feed3 Product1 Product2 Product3
-0.0200 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0100 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0200 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0100 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0200 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0100 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0200 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0100 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0200 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0100 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
-0.0200 1.1530 -0.0010 7.2870
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Tail1
35.5600
35.5500
35.5500
35.5500
35.5600
35.5600
35.5600
35.5500
35.5500
35.5500
35.5600

Tail2
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300
70.1300

APPENDIX E: Process Summary Report
Data from 19-Jul-2010 to 19-Jul-2010
-------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Feed1
Number of tanks processed 1
Tank 01
Start Time:
19-07-2010
18:17:04
Start Weight: 144.22
Stop Weight: 84.61
Stop Time:
19-07-2010
19:08:44
Delta:
59.61
The Station is empty 0.00% of the time
The Station is static 65.52% of the time
The Station is being utilized 34.48% of the time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Feed2
Number of tanks processed 1
Tank 01
Start Time:
19-07-2010
17:37:27
Start Weight: 140.86
Stop Weight: 35.49
Stop Time:
19-07-2010
19:15:18
Delta:
105.37
The Station is empty 6.42% of the time
The Station is static 28.33% of the time
The Station is being utilized 65.25% of the time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Feed3
Number of tanks processed 1
Tank 01
Start Time:
19-07-2010
17:34:53
Start Weight: 80.04
Stop Weight: 36.04
Stop Time:
19-07-2010
18:17:04
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Delta:
44.00
The Station is empty 9.41% of the time
The Station is static 62.42% of the time
The Station is being utilized 28.17% of the time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Product1
Number of tanks processed 1
Tank 01
Start Time:
19-07-2010
17:35:52
Start Weight: 1.15
Stop Weight: 9.78
Stop Time:
19-07-2010
19:14:13
Delta:
8.62
The Station is empty 2.66% of the time
The Station is static 31.77% of the time
The Station is being utilized 65.58% of the time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Product2
Number of tanks processed 0
The Station is empty 0.00% of the time
The Station is static 100.00% of the time
The Station is being utilized 0.00% of the time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Product3
Number of tanks processed 0
The Station is empty 0.00% of the time
The Station is static 100.00% of the time
The Station is being utilized 0.00% of the time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Tail1
Number of tanks processed 1
Tank 01
Start Time:
19-07-2010
18:26:57
Start Weight: 35.37
Stop Weight: 130.81
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Stop Time:

19-07-2010
19:15:38
Delta:
95.44
The Station is empty 3.49% of the time
The Station is static 64.03% of the time
The Station is being utilized 32.48% of the time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tank information for Tail2
Number of tanks processed 1
Tank 01
Start Time:
19-07-2010
17:35:27
Start Weight: 35.77
Stop Weight: 141.04
Stop Time:
19-07-2010
18:26:52
Delta:
105.27
The Station is empty 35.42% of the time
The Station is static 30.27% of the time
The Station is being utilized 34.31% of the time
-------------------------------------------------------------------Number of FEED tanks processed in this time: 3
Number of PRODUCT tanks processed in this tim3: 1
Number of TAILS tanks processed in this time: 2
The total inventory difference for these events is -0.35 kg.
Positive inventory difference means more material entered the mock cascade area then
left it.

145

VITA
James Joseph Henkel was born on March 4, 1985 in Honolulu, Hawaii. In 1997
he and his family moved to Knoxville, TN. There, he graduated from Karns High School
with honors in May 2003. He then attended the University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Nuclear Engineering in May 2007
and with his Masters of Science in Nuclear Engineering in May 2008.
As an undergraduate, James interned at the Y-12 National Security Complex
investigating the feasibility of implementing a microwave casting furnace. Then in 2004
he began part time work with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Nuclear Materials
Detection and Characterization group under Dr. John Mihalczo. That work continued
throughout his graduate studies. Since that time, he has worked on several projects for
verifying or detecting special nuclear material using active and passive interrogation
techniques. His work focuses primarily on the computer modeling of measurements.
Since coming to the lab, he has authored or co-authored over a dozen papers for
journals and conference proceedings.
In May, 2007, he began research with Dr. J. Wesley Hines investigating the
application of auto-associative model architectures for nuclear safeguards monitoring.
This work led to a partnership with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s International
Safeguards Group to develop a load cell monitoring system for their mock feed and
withdrawal facility. His current research is in the area of empirical modeling methods for
nuclear safeguards monitoring. He completed his Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering in July,
2011.
As an undergraduate, he was elected president of the University of Tennessee’s
American Nuclear Society student chapter. As a graduate student, he was a founding
member of the University of Tennessee’s Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
student chapter. He is also a nation member of both the American Nuclear Society and
the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. In 2007, he passed the Fundamentals
of Engineering exam to be recognized as an Engineering Intern.
146

